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ANTITRUST IN ZERO-PRICE MARKETS: 
APPLICATIONS 
JOHN M. NEWMAN

 
ABSTRACT 
“Free” products have exploded in popularity along with widespread 
Internet adoption—but many of them are not truly free. Customers often 
trade their attention or personal information to access zero-price 
products. This exchange dynamic brings zero-price markets within the 
scope of antitrust law. But despite the critical role that such markets now 
play in modern economies, the antitrust enterprise has largely failed to 
account for their unique attributes. 
In response, this Article undertakes two primary tasks. The first is to 
address particular areas of current antitrust doctrine that require revision 
or reinterpretation in the face of zero prices. Topics addressed include 
consumer standing (can attention or personal information qualify as 
“property” under the Clayton Act?), market definition (is the SSNIP-
based hypothetical-monopolist test still workable?), market power (can the 
traditional emphasis on “power to control price” be refocused on more 
relevant modes of competition?), defenses (is there a viable “free goods” 
defense?), and damages (can attentional or informational harms be 
quantified with the requisite degree of accuracy?).  
The second task is to examine applications of antitrust law to 
particular types of strategic conduct. Toward this end, the Article surveys 
and critiques the existing antitrust case law involving zero-price markets. 
Though this analysis reveals some flawed judicial reasoning, it also 
identifies an encouraging trend toward honest attempts to grapple with the 
distinctive difficulties posed by zero-price markets.  
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of Justice, Antitrust Division. The views expressed herein are solely the author’s and do not 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Free” products have exploded in popularity. Though often labeled as 
such, many of these products are not free.
1
 Social networks, web-based 
email, radio, television programs, news services, mapping programs, 
online search—all are now widely offered to customers with no prices 
attached. Yet many providers of these products are not acting 
altruistically; in fact, zero-price products have grown so profitable that 
their suppliers boast a combined market capitalization of well over $1 
trillion.
2
 Customers are exchanging something of value—most commonly 
their attention to advertisements or their personal information—in order to 
access zero-price products.
3
  
But despite the critical role that zero-price products now play in 
modern economies, analysts have failed to adequately account for the 
unique attributes of zero-price markets, leaving the antitrust enterprise 
woefully unprepared to play its traditional role of safeguarding 
marketplace competition. This failure has already caused substantial harm 
to consumer welfare; left unchecked, it will continue to do so. 
This Article seeks to address that failure. The choice of title was 
deliberate: to call zero-price products “free” is to beg the question. The 
discussion that follows builds on the fundamental observation that “free” 
products often are not free.
4
 Zero-price markets are a part—and, a fortiori, 
an increasingly vital part—of the “trade or commerce” Congress intended 
to regulate under the antitrust laws. Yet, antitrust institutions are, at best, 
only beginning to wrestle with the unique issues presented by zero-price 
transactions. 
 
 
 1. In common usage, “free” denotes zero cost. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF 
IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 12 (2001) (“[W]henever one says a 
resource is ‘free,’ most believe that a price is being quoted—free, that is, as in zero cost.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Market Capitalization of the Largest U.S. Internet Companies as of March 2016, 
STATISTICA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/209331/largest-us-internet-companies-by-market-cap/ 
(last visited June 2, 2016). Of the ten largest Internet companies listed, seven offered primarily or 
exclusively zero-price products—and these seven firms alone accounted for over $950 billion in 
market capitalization. 
 3. John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 
165–72 (2015). 
 4. Some zero-price products are truly free (or as close to free as is realistically possible)—for 
example, nonprofit organizations like the Wikimedia Foundation provide online services free of 
charge. See generally Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: 
Implications for Antitrust Enforcement 8 (N.Y. Univ. Law and Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 14-
44, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2529425 (explaining that an array of 
charitable, social, reputational, and even selfish motives underlie truly free product offerings). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Part II of this Article identifies and addresses several foundational 
aspects of the antitrust enterprise that are challenged by zero-prices. It 
begins by establishing that consumers of zero-price products may have 
standing to sue under the Clayton Act, which requires injury to a 
plaintiff’s “business or property.”5 The primary argument here is 
descriptive (though likely not uncontroversial); it employs textual, 
precedential, and purposive tools of analysis to conclude that, for the 
narrow purposes of Clayton Act standing, “property” includes information 
and attention. As a corollary, such consumers may also suffer antitrust 
injury, another element required for standing. Thus, courts ought to 
interpret and apply standing requirements so as to include consumers of 
zero-price products. This conclusion depends, for normative force, 
primarily on deontological, rather than utilitarian, grounds. 
Part II then turns to market definition and market power. The most 
commonly used tests for both elements depend on the presence of positive 
prices. As a result, existing case law suggests reason for concern—some 
courts have fallen into fallacious reasoning when attempting to define 
markets and measure power absent positive prices. But, as Part II explains, 
the frameworks underlying the traditional tests can be adapted to zero-
price markets. Drawing on a robust body of behavioral economics 
literature, Part II also observes that analyses of market definition and 
market power should account for the power of the Zero-Price Effect.  
Part II concludes by addressing defenses and damages. It demonstrates 
the unviability, as a matter of both antitrust law and antitrust economics, 
of the “free goods defense” already raised by at least one defendant. Part II 
also explores the knotty issue of damages calculations. Consumer 
psychology research reveals that stated preferences are highly unreliable 
vis-à-vis information and attention costs. As a result, Part II urges caution 
when stated preferences are proffered as a measure of damages in zero-
price markets.  
Part III surveys and critiques the extant case law involving zero-price 
markets. It is organized according to well-recognized categories of 
strategic conduct: horizontal competitor agreements, tying, exclusive 
dealing, etc. In part, the discussion is purely descriptive; it is the first 
attempt to gather and report all existing antitrust precedent involving zero-
price markets. The discussion is, by turns, also prescriptive: it not only 
evaluates the competence of judges’ rulings and reasoning, but also 
recommends superior alternatives for use in future cases. Ultimately, this 
 
 
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). 
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critique exposes a mixed bag. Antitrust courts have done much more than 
mere “hand waving” in the face of zero prices.6 Yet—perhaps 
unsurprisingly, given the general lack of guidance from analysts—they 
have often fallen into error. Thus, Part IV briefly concludes with a call to 
confront head-on the process of modernizing the antitrust enterprise to 
account for zero-price markets. 
II. THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE IN ZERO-PRICE MARKETS 
Zero-price markets pose substantial difficulties for several vital 
elements of antitrust doctrine. The discussion below is organized around 
the order in which those constituent elements tend to arise in antitrust 
litigation: standing, followed by market definition and market power, 
defenses, and remedies. 
A. Consumer Standing 
Federal antitrust law is enforced two ways: by the U.S. government and 
by private parties.
7
 The U.S. government is authorized to sue any party 
who has violated the antitrust laws.
8
 Private parties, however, must 
demonstrate that they have standing to sue.
9
 Clayton Act § 4, which 
authorizes private treble-damages recovery, grants standing to “any person 
who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything 
forbidden in the antitrust laws.”10 To be granted such standing, a private 
party must prove (1) injury to its “business or property,” and (2) that the 
injury suffered qualifies as “antitrust injury,” i.e., the particular type of 
injury cognizable under federal antitrust law.
11
 
1. Are Attention and Information “Property”?  
The U.S. government (as well as the rare private plaintiff seeking only 
injunctive relief)
12
 need not satisfy the Clayton Act § 4 “business or 
 
 
 6. But see David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Free, 7 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 71, 
72 (2011) (“[T]here is a tendency on the part of companies, authorities, and courts to do more hand 
waving than serious analysis when they encounter products and services offered for free.”). 
 7. 3 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP ¶ 335 n.1 (3d ed. 2007) (“Everyone other than 
the federal government falls into the “private” plaintiff category, which thus includes a state attorney 
general invoking federal antitrust law, whether on behalf of the state or of its citizens.”). 
 8. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
 9. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ¶ 335a. 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Private plaintiffs seeking only injunctive relief need not satisfy the “business or property” 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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property” requirement. Thus, for example, the federal government 
obtained an injunction against the defendants in United States v. H & R 
Block, Inc., a case involving (in part) zero-price products,
13
 without 
needing to prove injury to “business or property.” Private antitrust 
plaintiffs, however, almost universally seek treble damages, thereby 
triggering the business-or-property requirement. Private firms participating 
in zero-price markets can receive antitrust treble-damages standing by 
alleging injury to their “business.”14 Individual consumers, however, must 
rely on the “property” prong of the requirement.15 
“Property” (for purposes of Clayton Act § 4 standing) includes money. 
In Reiter, a class action brought by consumers against manufacturers of 
hearing aids,
16
 the U.S. Supreme Court held that “[a] consumer whose 
money has been diminished by reason of an antitrust violation has been 
injured ‘in his . . . property’ within the meaning of § 4.”17 Thus, consumers 
who are overcharged supracompetitive retail prices have antitrust standing, 
even where the relevant products were for personal use.
18
  
In zero-price markets, however, consumers generally pay not with 
money, but with their attention or information.
19
 Consumer standing in 
 
 
requirement. Clayton Act § 16, which authorizes injunctive relief, states simply that “[a]ny person . . . 
shall be entitled to . . . injunctive relief . . . against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage 
[by a violation of the antitrust laws under the traditional equitable principles].” 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2012). 
 13. 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 14. Cf. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 336 (“[Business] refers to ‘commercial interests 
or enterprises,’ although it also embraces nonprofit plaintiffs.” (citation omitted)). 
 15.  Cf. id. (“Illegally overcharged consumers are injured in their ‘property’ interest in the price 
and product quality of an unrestrained, competitive market.”). 
 16. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 335 (1979). Not at issue on appeal was whether the 
suit would have been barred under the indirect purchaser rule, which forecloses plaintiffs from 
recovering where they did not purchase the relevant products directly from the defendant(s). See id. at 
334–37. 
 17. Id. at 339. 
 18. Id. at 337–45. 
 19. Newman, supra note 3, at 152. But see Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online 
Market’s Consumer Preference Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95 (2013). Strandburg argues that 
equating payment via information to payment via money is erroneous:  
The common analogy between online data collection for behaviorally targeted advertising and 
payment for purchases is seriously misleading. There is no functioning market based on 
exchanges of personal information for access to online products and services. In a functioning 
market, payment of a given price signals consumer demand for particular goods and services, 
transmitting consumer preferences to producers. Data collection would serve as “payment” in 
that critical sense only if its transfer from users to collectors adequately signaled user 
preferences for online goods and services. It does not. 
Id. at 95. Strandburg convincingly demonstrates that markets involving the exchange of information 
for desired products are imperfect, and likely very imperfect. But it does not follow from such 
imperfections that “[t]here is no [such] functioning market.” Id. (emphasis added). Markets exist on a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/5
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zero-price markets thus presents a thorny—and, thus far, unanswered—
question: Are information and attention “property” for the narrow 
purposes of antitrust damages standing?
20
 
The following analysis suggests that the answer is “yes.” Courts have 
yet to weigh in squarely on the issue.
21
 The leading treatise observes 
briefly that “[n]onpecuniary injuries are not covered.”22 In general, 
antitrust theorists appear not to have raised or addressed the question in 
any depth. A number of privacy-law scholars have advanced the argument 
that personal information be treated as property for general legal 
purposes
23—there is also, however, “an extensive literature on the 
problems” of doing so.24 Against the backdrop of this robust scholarly 
debate, courts have been uniformly reluctant to treat personal information 
as property for general legal purposes.
25
 Left unexplored by both privacy 
scholars and courts is the question of whether attention should ever be 
treated as property. 
For the narrow purposes of Clayton Act standing, the better reading of 
“property” is to include information and attention when they are 
exchanged for the relevant product(s). A preliminary caveat: this Article 
does not seek to weigh in on the scholarly debate, mentioned above, over 
 
 
spectrum, ranging from “perfectly imperfect” to “perfectly perfect.” Imperfect competition does not 
equal zero competition. This argument is addressed more thoroughly in Newman, supra note 3. 
 20. In a state unfair-competition case, a federal district court flatly concluded that “[a] plaintiff’s 
‘personal information’ does not constitute property under [California’s Unfair Competition Law].” In 
re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 714 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Thompson v. Home 
Depot, Inc., No. 07cv1058 IEG (WMc), 2007 WL 2746603, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007)). 
 21. Interestingly (albeit tangentially), firms’ databases may be regarded as personal property for 
purposes of secured transactions, even if the data is not protected under copyright or trade-secret law. 
See, e.g., In re Levitz Ins. Agency, Inc., 152 B.R. 693, 697 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992); Xuan-Thao N. 
Nguyen, Collateralizing Privacy, 78 TUL. L. REV. 553, 580–81 (2004). 
 22. 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 345, at 156. This may be referring only to the 
personal-injury scenarios contemplated in, e.g., Chadda v. Burcke, 180 F. App’x 370 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 23. See, e.g., Christopher Rees, Tomorrow’s Privacy: Personal Information as Property, 3 INT’L 
DATA PRIVACY L. 220, 220–21 (2013); Jamie Lund, Property Rights to Information, 10 NW. J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 1 (2011); Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 
56, 63–65 (1999); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic 
Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383 (1996). 
 24. Jeffrey M. Skopek, Anonymity, the Production of Goods, and Institutional Design, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1751, 1800 n.227 (2014) (citing examples). 
 25. See Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy as Quasi-Property, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1121 (2016). 
Scholz posits that “privacy as property has taken hold in the courts,” supporting the statement by 
noting two privacy-related torts that “are routinely handled as the property interest ‘right of publicity’ 
in several jurisdictions.” Id. But, as Scholz recognizes, “the right of publicity is not relevant to all 
forms of privacy.” Id. Moreover, the negative implication is that by recognizing only those two types 
of privacy harms as touching upon property rights, even the subset of courts that grant this narrow 
recognition are simultaneously declining to recognize general property rights over personal 
information. 
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whether individuals possess general property rights in their information, 
nor does it seek to begin such a debate over whether individuals should 
possess such rights in their attention. The scope of the present claim is 
restricted to Clayton Act standing. 
It is, to be sure, unlikely that Congress contemplated either information 
or attention when enacting the Clayton Act in 1914. Then, as now, neither 
was treated as such for broader legal purposes. Under a strictly originalist 
interpretation, therefore, zero-price consumers would likely lack standing 
to seek damages under the Clayton Act.
26
  
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has not employed such an approach 
in interpreting the Clayton Act’s grant of standing. Reasoning that the 
statute serves an “expansive remedial purpose,” the Court has refused to 
take a “technical or semantic approach” in interpreting it.27 Rather, the 
Court has identified the task and available tools as follows: 
The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, 
and the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to 
construction. . . . [W]e are to read the statutory language in its 
ordinary and natural sense, and if doubts remain, resolve them in the 
light . . . of the policy intended to be served by the enactment [and] 
by all other available aids to construction.
28
 
Using this holistic approach to interpretation in the Reiter case, the Court 
observed that “the word ‘property’ has a naturally broad and inclusive 
meaning. In its dictionary definitions and in common usage ‘property’ 
comprehends anything of material value owned or possessed.”29 In fact, 
lower courts have read “property” broadly enough to include interests not 
commonly thought of as “owned or possessed,” for example, a labor 
union’s opportunity to obtain members30 or the opportunity to work as an 
 
 
 26. Cf. Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process: 
Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 805 (1994) 
(“[O]riginalist interpretive models treat statutes as commands that emanate from the legislative branch. 
The judge’s role as interpreter is limited to deciphering these commands and applying them to 
particular cases.”). 
 27. Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313 (1978). 
 28. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941). 
 29. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979). 
 30. E.g., Int’l Ass’n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v. United Contractors Ass’n, 
483 F.2d 384, 398 (3d Cir. 1973) (“Since their income is derived from the dues of their members, it 
would be contrary to common sense to say that a right to acquire members is not a property right of a 
labor union.”). 
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employee at a rival firm.
31
 Even though such opportunities “may not be 
property in the ordinary sense,”32 they may support Clayton Act standing. 
Given such a broad reading, the business-or-property “limiting words 
are of little effect today.”33 As the leading treatise explains, “Reiter . . . 
made plain that the ‘business or property’ requirement is virtually always 
satisfied provided there is some kind of injury that can properly be 
characterized as economic.”34 Zero-price markets involve commerce and 
exchange of the type that can give rise to economic gains from trade.
35
 
Such markets can, therefore, allow economic harm that is structurally 
identical to the types of harms traditionally cognizable under the antitrust 
laws. Consumers who have incurred monetary overcharges suffer harm to 
their “‘property’ interest in the price and product quality of an 
unrestrained, competitive market.”36 Like all consumers, those who use 
zero-price products have a “property interest” in the fruits of a competitive 
marketplace. That interest can suffer economic injury.
37
 As a result, 
existing precedent disfavors a categorical denial of standing to consumers 
of zero-price products. 
Moreover, as the Reiter Court observed, “‘property’ comprehends 
anything of material value owned or possessed.”38 Information and 
attention have come to hold “material value.” And consumers may 
“possess” their information or attention, even assuming they do not “own” 
those assets as a general matter of property law.
39
 One might well ask: If 
consumers do not initially possess their information or attention, who 
does? Consumers possess their attention, and at least some types of their 
information, until the moment they trade these assets to firms in exchange 
for valuable products. Pursuing the transaction further through the chain of 
distribution bolsters this conclusion. For example, once a firm has 
collected and stored personal information in its servers, the firm—which 
can often exclude third parties from accessing that particular data while it 
is under the firm’s control—would seem to possess that information. Such 
 
 
 31. Nichols v. Spencer Int’l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1967). 
 32. Id. 
 33. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 335c1. 
 34. Id. ¶ 336. 
 35. See Newman, supra note 3. 
 36. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 336. 
 37. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing antitrust injury). 
 38. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979) (emphasis added). 
 39. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text (discussing the debate over whether 
information is “property” for general legal purposes). 
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firms often sell data to third parties. Again, one might ask: If the seller 
never possessed the information, what was sold?
 
Finally, the Court instructs that where interpretation of the Clayton Act 
seems doubtful, issues should be resolved “in the light . . . of the policy 
intended to be served by the enactment.”40 The antitrust laws are meant to 
remedy harm to the competitive process resulting from the creation, 
enhancement, or abuse of market power.
41
 Because the enhancement of 
power in zero-price markets can—and has—resulted in harm to 
competition and consumers,
42
 an inclusive reading of “property” would 
further that policy. Thus, courts applying the Clayton Act’s grant of 
standing should interpret “property” so as to include attention and 
information. 
2. Antitrust Injury 
Mere injury to “business or property” is not enough for antitrust 
standing. Plaintiffs must also demonstrate “antitrust injury, which is to say 
injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that 
flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”43 The particular 
types of injury that qualify generally include higher prices (i.e., 
overcharges), reduced output, lower quality, or less innovation.
44
 
Consumers of zero-price products can suffer any of these types of harm 
as a result of anticompetitive conduct—only the medium, not the fact, of 
exchange is different.
45
 Anticompetitive conduct in zero-price markets 
may yield higher attention or information costs (i.e., overcharges), reduced 
output of the zero-price or an interrelated product, lower quality, or less 
competitive efforts directed toward innovation. 
The principle of “treating like things alike” is “an idea of great 
resonance for law (equal justice under law, equal protection of the laws, 
equality before the law, one law for rich and poor, and so forth).”46 
Consumers of zero-price products can suffer—and have suffered—
 
 
 40. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941). 
 41. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps 
Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2406 (2013) (referring to “[t]he promotion of economic welfare 
as the lodestar of antitrust laws” (citation omitted)). 
 42. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 3, at 175–76 (discussing welfare harm to listeners resulting 
from broadcast-radio mergers). 
 43. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
 44.  See generally Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986) (denying 
standing to a competitor that claimed only “loss of profits due to possible price competition”). 
 45. Newman, supra note 3, at 190. 
 46. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42 (1990). 
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antitrust harms that are structurally identical to those suffered by 
consumers of positive-price products.
47
 It would thus run counter to a 
fundamental, time-honored legal principle to treat as cognizable injuries to 
one group but not to the other. 
Radio mergers provide an instructive example. Satellite radio is 
generally delivered to listeners in exchange for subscription fees, while 
broadcast-radio listeners consume the product at zero prices. In 2008, 
Sirius and XM, then the two major satellite-radio providers, merged.
48
 
After the merger, Sirius XM allegedly raised the subscription fees it 
charged listeners.
49
 A class action comprising satellite-radio consumers 
filed antitrust claims against the merged entity under Clayton Act § 7 and 
Sherman Act § 2. Although the defendant challenged plaintiffs’ standing 
to bring certain state-law claims, it conceded federal antitrust standing,
50
 
an unsurprising move given that plaintiffs likely possessed such standing. 
Ultimately, after having received certification, the class settled out of court 
for a package valued at $193 million.
51
  
Analogous overcharges have occurred in broadcast-radio markets. 
Following the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the 
industry experienced rapid, massive consolidation. Empirical research 
demonstrates that as competition in many markets dwindled, airtime 
devoted to advertisements increased.
52
 Thus, broadcast-radio listeners have 
suffered (and likely continue to suffer) attention-cost overcharges 
stemming from a reduction in competition.
53
 As a structural matter, these 
overcharges are no different than those allegedly suffered by satellite-radio 
customers. It would be an odd public policy that called for disparate 
treatment of the two groups by barring one from effective access to the 
courts. To the extent antitrust law should treat consumers of zero-price 
products differently,
54
 it ought not do so at the standing stage. 
Information- or attention-based harms are not mere “personal” injuries, 
which are insufficient to confer antitrust standing. Suffering an injury 
 
 
 47. Newman, supra note 3, at 174. 
 48. Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. M. Sean Royall & Adam J. Di Vincenzo, When Mergers Become a Private Matter: An 
Updated Antitrust Primer, 26 ANTITRUST 41, 42 (2012). 
 52. Catherine Tyler Mooney, Market Power and Audience Segmentation Drive Radio 
Advertising Levels 19 (Apr. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/ 
conference/download.cgi?db_name=IIOC2010&paper_id=203. 
 53. Newman, supra note 3, at 193. 
 54. For some purposes, such consumers should receive unique analytical treatment. See infra 
Parts II.B–II.E. 
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causally linked to an antitrust violation is not per se enough to confer 
antitrust standing.
55
 A personal injury will not suffice.
56
 In Chadda v. 
Burcke, for example, a plaintiff who purportedly suffered bodily injuries 
from a defective cosmetic sold to her by the defendant could not recover 
under the antitrust laws, even assuming the defendant’s alleged 
anticompetitive conduct caused the product defect.
57
 The antitrust harm in 
such a case would consist only of the overcharge—the difference in price 
between the cosmetic as sold and the cosmetic as it would have been sold 
in a competitive market. Attention and information overcharges are 
“personal” in a sense; they involve costs extracted from the “person” of a 
consumer. But they are not personal injuries in the sense that would 
disqualify remedy under the antitrust laws. Where attention or information 
overcharges (or lower quality, less innovation, etc.) result from the 
creation, enhancement, or abuse of market power, they lie squarely within 
the boundaries of the antitrust laws.  
The Clayton Act’s standing provision encompasses consumers of zero-
price products. Congress intended to create a dual-enforcement structure 
for the antitrust laws.
58
 If one leg of that structure is hamstrung by a lack 
of damages standing, the antitrust enterprise will fail to function as 
intended. 
B. Modernizing Traditional Standards: Market Definition and Market 
Power 
The core concern of modern antitrust is with market power. In most 
cases, defining the relevant market is a prerequisite to proving that a 
defendant has market power. Thus, the market definition and market 
power inquiries are of utmost importance to antitrust doctrine. Yet, current 
formulations of these inquiries depend on the presence of positive prices. 
Zero-price markets, then, present a challenge for antitrust—though not an 
unworkable one. 
1. Market Definition 
Market definition has come under attack from some scholars,
59
 and the 
2010 FTC/DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMGs) relegate market 
 
 
 55. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 345 (“Nonpecuniary injuries are not covered.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Chadda v. Burcke, 180 F. App’x 370 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 58. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 59. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Market Definition: Impossible and Counterproductive, 79 
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definition to a somewhat diminished role as compared with earlier 
versions.
60
 Yet defining the relevant market remains an important, often 
crucial, element of antitrust analysis.
61
 The core assumption is that (ceteris 
paribus) the higher a firm’s share, the greater the firm’s market power. 
And market definition can also play other roles in antitrust analysis, 
including examining entry, assessing competitive effects, and adding 
“clarity and power” to narratives in antitrust cases.62 
a. Reasonable and Functional Interchangeability 
In the U.S. tradition, market definition focuses on demand elasticity. 
The standard most commonly cited by courts hinges on “reasonable 
interchangeability.”63 Under this standard, products are part of the same 
relevant market where they are reasonably interchangeable by customers.
64
 
As do many “reasonableness” standards, the reasonable-interchangeability 
test presents a façade of clarity that disguises a lack of actual guidance. At 
some extreme level, all products could be thought of as interchangeable: 
customers with scarce resources must choose how to allocate those 
resources, and a decision to acquire one product necessitates (at the 
margin) giving up the opportunity to acquire another. Thus, for example, a 
consumer may decide to forego dinner at a restaurant in order to save for 
retirement. It does not follow that restaurant meals and mutual funds are 
part of the same antitrust product market. Conversely, no product is 
perfectly interchangeable with another; there will always be some minute 
 
 
ANTITRUST L.J. 361 (2013). 
 60. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 4 (2010) (“The Agencies’ analysis need not start with market definition. Some of the 
analytical tools used by the Agences to assess competitive effects do not rely on market definition 
. . . .”), with U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1 
(1992) (“[F]or each product or service . . . of each merging firm, the Agency seeks to define a market 
in which firms could effectively exercise market power if they were able to coordinate their actions.”). 
 61. Market definition currently plays a significant role in the analysis of mergers under Clayton 
Act § 7, restraints of trade that fall under the “rule of reason” under Sherman Act § 1, and 
monopolization (and attempted monopolization) under Sherman Act § 2.  
 62. See Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor Kaplow, 2, 14, 
21 (Feb. 13, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2004655. 
 63. Perhaps the most commonly cited formulation appears in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). 
 64. See Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31 (1953) (“The circle 
must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product to which, within reasonable variations in price, 
only a limited number of buyers will turn; in technical terms, products whose ‘cross-elasticities of 
demand’ are small.”). 
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difference in cost, packaging, branding, etc.
65
 Yet it does not follow that 
Chiquita and Del Monte bananas are part of different antitrust product 
markets.
66
 The reasonable-interchangeability test does make clear that 
neither extreme end of the spectrum is the correct starting point. But 
beyond this, it offers little aid. 
Courts and enforcement agencies have used a variety of tools to 
attempt to answer the question of whether products are “reasonably 
interchangeable.”67 Most of these focus on prices. For example, the 
Court’s analysis in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 
hinged on “the extent to which consumers will change their consumption 
of one product in response to a price change in another.”68 Another 
common method is exemplified by Judge Hand’s finding in United States 
v. Alcoa that price differences between two products indicated that those 
products were not in the same market.
69
  
Courts and enforcers have also looked to functional attributes in 
determining whether products are “reasonably interchangeable.” Where 
products serve similar functions (e.g., cellophane and butcher paper), 
courts have concluded that they belong in the same product market.
70
 
Again, though, problems with levels of abstraction arise. At a high level, 
cellophane and butcher paper both serve the function of wrapping 
foodstuffs: they may be said to be “functionally interchangeable.” At a 
low level, however, butcher paper has much lower pliability and much 
higher permeability than cellophane. The U.S. Supreme Court, using a 
high level of abstraction in analyzing functional characteristics, found that 
cellophane competed in the same market as other “flexible wrappings” and 
concluded that no single firm had monopoly power in that market.
71
 This 
 
 
 65. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956) (“[O]ne can 
theorize that we have monopolistic competition in every nonstandardized commodity with each 
manufacturer having power over the price and production of his own product. However, this power . . . 
is not the power that makes an illegal monopoly.” (citation omitted)). 
 66. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? 
Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2080 (2012) (“To an antitrust lawyer, 
brands aren’t markets.”). Lemley and McKenna contend that this common heuristic is deficient in the 
face of modern markets, which feature products that are often—and perhaps most often—quite 
differentiated. Id. at 2081. 
 67. See generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 556–75 
(Jonathan M. Jacobson et al. eds., 6th ed. 2007). 
 68. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 (1992) (emphasis added). 
 69. United States v. Alumnium Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 276–77 (1964). 
 70. E.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377. 
 71. Id. at 399–404. 
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conclusion later came to be regarded as incorrect.
72
 With “functional 
interchangeability” as with “reasonable interchangeability,” inconsistent 
application of the law is inevitable. 
The more heterogeneous are the products in a market, the worse the 
analysis seems to become. Courts have reached wildly varying results in 
highly differentiated product markets. Adjudicated antitrust product 
markets have ranged from very narrow, idiosyncratic markets—e.g., for 
Jackson Pollock paintings
73—to broad, all-encompassing markets like “ice 
cream”74 or “furniture.”75 Confronted with differentiated products, which 
fall along a “spectrum of price and quality differences,”76 antitrust 
tribunals often have thrown up their hands, making observations like 
“product variances . . . are economically meaningless where the 
differences are actually part of a spectrum.”77  
Zero-price products are often highly differentiated (at least from the 
perspective of users),
78
 making the reasonable-interchangeability approach 
(and its functional-interchangeability variant) particularly unsuited for 
market-definition analysis. Despite this, at least one court used a 
functional-interchangeability approach to define a zero-price market.
79
 In 
LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., the district court accepted an alleged 
market for “Internet-based social networking.”80 Pointing to “Internet 
connectivity services like America Online,” as well as “online dating 
sites,” the defendant argued for a broader definition.81 The court rejected 
those contentions, reasoning that Internet connectivity services “simply 
. . . give users the ability to access the Internet,” and that online dating 
 
 
 72. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 937, 960–61 (1981) (explaining that the Court likely erred by inferring lack of market 
power from the observed fact that “there was some substitution between cellophane and other flexible 
wrapping materials at the current price of cellophane”). 
 73. Vitale v. Marlborough Gallery, No. 93 Civ. (PKL) 6276, 1994 WL 654494, at *3−4 
(S.D.N.Y. July, 5 1994). 
 74. In re Super Premium Ice Cream Distrib. Antitrust Litig., 691 F. Supp. 1262, 1268 (N.D. Cal. 
1988). 
 75. See Murrow Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Inds., Inc., 889 F.2d 524, 528 
(4th Cir. 1989). 
 76. Id. at 528 (quoting In re Super Premium Ice Cream Distrib. Antitrust Litig., 691 F. Supp. at 
1268) (emphasis omitted). 
 77. E.g., Western Parcel Express v. UPS, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (quoting In 
re Super Premium Ice Cream Distrib. Antitrust Litig., 691 F. Supp. at 1268). 
 78. See Newman, supra note 3 at 178. 
 79. LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV 06−6994 AHM (RZx), 2007 WL 6865852, at 
*4 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007), aff’d, 304 Fed. Appx. 554 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 80. Id. at *7 (“[T]he Court finds that LiveUniverse sufficiently alleges a relevant antitrust market 
of Internet-based social networking websites.”). 
 81. Id. at *5−6. 
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sites’ “dominant function and purpose is to enable users to meet potential 
dates.”82 In contrast, online social networks were “used to get in touch 
with old friends and to keep current friends informed about what’s new 
and exciting,” attributes that rendered social networks sufficiently unique 
as to constitute a relevant antitrust market.
83
 Though the court may have 
been correct in concluding that online social networking was a relevant 
market, its analysis lacked rigor.  
Because they allow such subjective applications, these standards 
present serious problems in practice. Those problems are likely to worsen, 
rather than improve, in the zero-price context. Consequently, antitrust law 
ought to leave such approaches behind, or at least relegate them to a 
secondary role, when confronting zero-price markets.  
The widespread adoption of the hypothetical monopolist test (HMT) 
approach is due in large part to the unworkability of bare “reasonable” and 
“functional” interchangeability analyses and the inchoate body of case law 
they have spawned.
84
 The question, then, is whether even the more modern 
HMT approach is workable, for it—like much of antitrust law—depends 
heavily on positive prices. 
b. The HMT and Proposed Reforms: Implementing a “SSNIC” Test 
In merger, and at least occasionally in non-merger
85
 contexts, U.S. 
courts and antitrust enforcement agencies employ the HMT to define 
markets.
86
 The HMT asks whether a hypothetical firm that controlled all 
sales of the relevant product(s) would likely be able to profitably impose 
“at least a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price 
(SSNIP) on at least one product in the market.”87 A SSNIP is usually—
 
 
 82. Id. at *6. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 910b (explaining that the advent of 
the HMT was a response to the outmoded reasoning on display in Brown Shoe and its progeny). 
 85. Some contend that problems inhere in extending the HMT to non-merger analyses. See 
Lawrence J. White, Market Power and Market Definition in Monopolization Cases: A Paradigm Is 
Missing, in 2 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 913 (2008) (“[T]he [HMT market definition 
paradigm] is sensibly used only in the context of a forward-looking question: ‘Will this merger permit 
the creation or enhancement of market power?’”). 
 86. See, e.g., In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262 (6th Cir. 2014) (contemplating 
application of the HMT to Sherman Act § 1 and § 2 claims); United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. 
Supp. 3d 143, 176 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (discussing Government expert economist’s use of the HMT to 
define the relevant market in a Sherman Act § 1 case). 
 87. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 60, § 4.1.1.  
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though not always—taken to mean a two-year, five-percent increase in the 
total price paid by customers.
88
 
This analytical framework loses its coherence in zero-price markets, 
where the basic unit of value extracted from customers is not expressed as 
a price. Mathematically, “[t]he SSNIP test becomes inoperable when the 
basic price is zero.”89 Five percent of zero is still zero. 
Without some sense of proportion between the hypothetical price 
increase and the total price, the hypothetical-monopolist test as currently 
constituted becomes unsatisfyingly arbitrary. Zero-price markets offer no 
reference point for sizing the hypothetical price increase. As a result, any 
number used will be the product of haphazard selection.
90
  
A recent case illustrates the problem. In Streamcast Networks, 
Streamcast and Kazaa distributed competing versions of a peer-to-peer 
(P2P) software application called “FastTrack.”91 Streamcast filed Sherman 
Act claims against Kazaa and others, alleging a “worldwide market for the 
provision of FastTrack P2P file-sharing services and the selling of 
advertising directed to users of such services.”92 The district court first 
enunciated the standard for defining antitrust markets, citing the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s statement in Eastman Kodak that markets are defined 
using cross-elasticity of demand, which “refers to ‘the extent to which 
consumers will change their consumption of one product in response to a 
price change in another.’”93 The Streamcast court proceeded to reject the 
alleged market as too narrow, reasoning that “there is simply no indication 
 
 
 88.  Id. § 4.1.2 (“The Agencies most often use a SSNIP of five percent.”); see United States v. 
Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13−cv−00133−WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *32 (defining a relevant market as 
“R&R platforms in the United States for retailers and manufacturers” in part because “other social 
commerce tools are most often complements rather than substitutes, and there is no persuasive 
evidence that this will change in the next two years” (emphasis added)). 
 89. Evans, supra note 6, at 72; see also Minsuk Han, Barely Legal: The Antitrust Economics of 
Free Software: Can Firms Evade Antitrust Scrutiny by Selling Apps for Free?, CORNELL DAILY SUN 
(May 2, 2014), https://issuu.com/cornellsun/docs/05-02-14_entire_issue_lo_res (“[I]f the base price of 
a product is zero, we cannot define the relevant market using the Hypothetical Monopolist Test.”). 
 90. The limitations of the SSNIP test when applied to free goods have been recognized 
elsewhere. See Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 32; Cf. Miguel Sousa Ferro, “Ceci N’est Pas un 
Marché”: Gratuity and Competition Law 8–16 (Sept. 8, 2014) (preliminary draft), http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2493236; Evans, supra note 6; Angela Daly, Free Software and the 
Law: Out of the Frying Pan and into the Fire: How Shaking up Intellectual Property Suits 
Competition Just Fine, J. PEER PRODUCTION (2013), http://peerproduction.net/issues/issue-3-free-
software-epistemics/peer-reviewed-papers/; Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 
90 N.C L. REV. 1771, 1785−86 (2012). 
 91. Streamcast Networks, Inc. v. Skype Techs., S.A., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1089–90 (C.D. Cal. 
2007). 
 92. Id. at 1094. 
 93. Id. (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 (1992)) 
(emphasis added). 
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that users . . . would not switch from FastTrack . . . to another provider or 
network if even the most nominal of fees were charged.”94 Yet, without 
some basis for comparing the price increase to the total price, this analysis 
lacks rigor—it is meaningless to call a price increase “nominal” if the 
benchmark price is zero.
95
 This fallacy is referred to infra as the “First 
Streamcast Fallacy.” 
Despite this shortcoming, however, the HMT may not be entirely 
unworkable in zero-price markets. By substituting the relevant exchanged 
cost(s)—i.e., information and/or attention—for prices, enforcers may gain 
insight as to how closely products compete. The question becomes 
whether a hypothetical monopolist would likely impose an “SSNIC”—a 
small but significant and non-transitory increase in (exchanged) costs—on 
customers.
96
 For example, investigators analyzing a merger between two 
search providers might ask whether a market-wide five percent increase in 
the amount (or length, duration, etc.) of advertisements would cause 
search customers to substitute away to a different product.
97
 Alternatively, 
a court might base its market definition in part on evidence of past 
increases in the levels of attention or information costs extracted by the 
market participants. 
The nature of zero-price markets does raise several potential problems 
that must be confronted in the course of conducting SSNIC analyses. First, 
analysts must cabin their inquiries to situations that hold constant all 
variables other than the one of interest. Both attention costs and 
information costs can be quite heterogeneous, complicating analyses 
considerably.
98
 For example, consumers may not perceive a five-percent 
increase in the space devoted to advertisements to be an additional cost at 
all, if the increase is accompanied by a substantial enough decrease in (for 
example) the length of time during which those advertisements are 
displayed. Likewise, a consumer may not perceive a five-percent increase 
in the amount of information requested by a supplier to be a net cost where 
there is a corresponding decrease in the sensitivity of the information 
 
 
 94. Id. at 1095 (emphasis added). 
 95. It bears noting that increasing prices from zero to any positive number represents an infinite 
increase, raising the question of how an infinite increase can also be nominal. 
 96. Or, for a monopsonist, on buyers. As explained more fully infra, this reference to “costs” 
should not be taken to mean all costs incurred in a transaction. Rather, the focus is on exchanged costs. 
In the type of transactions salient here, those comprise information costs, attention costs, or both. 
 97. This discussion follows the district court’s reasoning in United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 
F. Supp. 3d 143, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), that “two-sided platform[s] comprise[] at least two separate, 
yet deeply interrelated, markets.”  
 98. See discussion, supra Part II.A.1. 
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requested.
99
 Unless analysts take care to hold such variables constant, this 
heterogeneity could increase the likelihood of error, along with its 
attendant costs. 
This difficulty illuminates a second question: What is the relevant cost? 
The HMT is ultimately concerned with how customers (or sellers, in the 
case of buyer-power analyses) would respond to an increase in the 
exchanged cost of the relevant product. In traditional, positive-price 
markets, analysts can properly view price as representing the relevant 
exchanged cost: the price paid constitutes the valuable consideration 
exchanged by buyers for the relevant product(s). But in zero-price 
markets, this is not the case. Firms in zero-price markets often make their 
profits by extracting information, attention, or both.
100
 In other words, the 
cost to zero-price customers of a given relevant product may consist 
entirely of increased information costs, entirely of increased attention 
costs, or a combination of the two in any proportion. Analysts must tailor 
their focus to the appropriate cost(s)—i.e., the cost(s) most likely to be 
increased by a hypothetical monopolist.
101
 
In some clear-cut cases, the relevant cost will be immediately apparent. 
For example, in broadcast-radio markets, listeners incur attention costs, 
but not information costs.
102
 Mixed cases are more difficult. Here, the 
proper question is whether a hypothetical monopolist likely would 
profitably impose at least a SSNIC in either information or attention costs. 
If the answer is yes to either type of cost, the market under analysis should 
be considered a relevant antitrust market: it is susceptible to 
anticompetitive effects stemming from market power. 
Complicating matters further, customers’ perceptions of information 
and attention costs may be inaccurate. This unreliability may present 
practical problems for hypothetical-monopolist market-definition analyses. 
It is relatively difficult for consumers to evaluate the costs and benefits of 
zero-price products.
103
 Hoofnagle and Whittington posit that “free offers 
 
 
 99. To illustrate, this could occur if a supplier were to stop requesting Social Security numbers 
and start requesting additional, but less sensitive, information. 
 100. See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text. 
 101. This process is somewhat analogous to one contemplated by the HMGs: “Where explicit or 
implicit prices for the firms’ specific contribution to value can be identified with reasonable clarity, the 
Agencies may base the SSNIP on those prices.” HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 60,  
§ 4.1.2. The Agencies appear to have done so on only one occasion to date. See Competitive Impact 
Statement at 10, United States v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00823 (D.D.C. May 20, 2014). 
 102. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
 103. See, e.g., David Adam Friedman, Free Offers: A New Look, 38 N.M. L. REV. 49, 73 (2008) 
(“Valuing bundles [that include free offers] can be an opaque exercise and can cause consumers to 
make purchase decisions differently depending on presentation.”).  
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are . . . used widely as an enticement to get consumers to try a product 
without realizing its costs.”104 Strandburg claims that consumers generally 
do not understand the types and prevalence of potential data-collection-
related harms, do not understand firms’ data-related practices, and do not 
understand “how any given instance of data collection fits into the data 
about them that is already flowing in the online ecosystem.”105 And 
Shelanski suggests that “a platform’s use and protection of customer data 
is often difficult for consumers to observe or understand.”106  
These problems of transparency and calculability are relatively less 
present with regard to attention costs, where consumers are at least 
sometimes able to observe and better understand the trade-offs they 
face.
107
 Even here, however, technological advances have complicated the 
picture. Behavioral (or “targeted”) advertising creates greater consumer 
uncertainty than the more familiar “contextual” advertising that 
accompanied traditional zero-price products like broadcast television and 
radio.
108
 And, as discussed further infra, consumers may underestimate 
attention costs attendant to all advertisements, not just behavioral ones.
109
 
Finally, information costs are unique—while they represent a cost to 
customers, they do not automatically translate into increased profits for 
suppliers, at least not in the short run. Using the example of “an online 
publisher that decides to collect and mine additional consumer data,” 
Cooper points out that “collecting, storing, and analyzing data is an 
additional cost” to the publisher.110 Ultimately, suppliers increase 
information costs to improve the quality of their products, increase 
advertising-related revenues (or revenues from simply selling the extra 
 
 
 104. Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s 
Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 613 (2014). 
 105. Strandburg, supra note 19, at 132–33 (concluding that “Internet users cannot make 
meaningful assessments of the marginal expected disutility of any given use of an online product or 
service”). 
 106. Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet, 161 
U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1690 (2013). 
 107. This is true at least after the customer has experienced the relevant product; many forms of 
digital content comprise “experience goods,” the value (and, in the zero-price context, cost) of which 
cannot ex ante be accurately assessed by consumers. See Hannibal Travis, Google Book Search and 
Fair Use: iTunes for Authors, or Napster for Books?, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 87, 101–02 (2006) 
(explaining, within a discussion of IP-protected digital content, that “the quality and characteristics of 
experience goods typically ‘can be assessed only after they are bought” (quoting MICHAEL PARKIN, 
MICROECONOMICS 468 (2d ed. 1994))). 
 108. See Strandburg, supra note 19, at 131 (“[I]t is nearly impossible for a consumer to estimate 
the increment in expected harm associated with a given instance of data collection.”). 
 109. See infra notes 216–29 and accompanying text. 
 110. James C. Cooper, Privacy and Antitrust: Underpants Gnomes, the First Amendment, and 
Subjectivity, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1129, 1135 (2013) (emphasis omitted). 
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data, perhaps to advertisers), or both.
111
 From this, Cooper concludes that 
“reducing privacy would be an odd way to exercise market power.”112 This 
conclusion holds as to the first motive for suppliers increasing information 
costs: improving product quality would be an odd way to exercise market 
power, though it may ultimately lead to higher revenues. The conclusion 
does not, however, hold true as to the second motive: increasing 
information costs to increase advertising-related revenues would be a 
rational way for a firm to exercise market power. Thus, a SSNIC test 
focusing on information cost is an appropriate means of defining markets 
(and ultimately allowing inferences about market power)—but analysts 
must hold constant an additional variable. The appropriate question is 
whether a hypothetical monopolist would likely impose a SSNIC without 
increasing the quality of the relevant product.
113
 
All of these issues counsel against placing too much weight on the 
evidence yielded by zero-price customer interviews, one of the most 
common fact-gathering methods used by antitrust analysts.
114
 That is not 
to say, however, that such evidence has no value. Although information 
and attention costs are more problematic in terms of transparency and 
calculability than are prices, they are not entirely opaque. Customers can, 
and sometimes do, make purchasing or product-substitution decisions 
based on relative changes in information or attention costs.
115
 Thus, 
analysts and courts should not entirely discount industry-participant 
interview evidence in zero-price markets. Furthermore, evidence of 
revealed preferences (e.g., natural experiments) is not subject to many of 
these shortcomings. 
c. Application and Limitations of a “SSNIQ” Test 
To date, the only high court to have squarely addressed market 
definition in a zero-price context is the Chinese Supreme People’s Court. 
In Qihoo 360 v. Tencent, the People’s Court engaged in a sophisticated 
analysis of several issues arising out of an alleged violation of China’s 
 
 
 111. See id. at 1135–36. 
 112. Id. at 1136. 
 113. Put another way, the question is, “Would a hypothetical monopolist likely impose a SSNIC 
in order to sell the additional information or use it to increase advertising revenues?” 
 114. See infra notes 208–20 and accompanying text. 
 115. See, e.g., Erik Gruenwedel, CEO: Hulu Plus Eyeing Ad-Free Streaming, HOME MEDIA 
MAGAZINE (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.homemediamagazine.com/hulu/ceo-hulu-plus-eyeing-ad-free-
streaming-31484?print=1 (“[Hulu’s CEO] acknowledged what has emerged as a not-so-positive 
differentiator between Hulu Plus and [its competitors]: ad spots.”). 
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Anti-Monopoly Law (AML).
116
 Among these was whether the HMT was 
appropriate given that the relevant product (online instant messaging 
services) was offered “free.”117  
The People’s Court avoided the First Streamcast Fallacy. As a general 
matter, the court observed, “when the market equilibrium price of a 
commodity is zero, it is particularly difficult to use SSNIP because it is 
necessary to determine an appropriate benchmark price.”118 More 
specifically, the court pointed out, the problem arises because, “[w]hen the 
benchmark price is zero, the price remains at zero after growth of 5–
10%.”119 Thus—unlike the Streamcast court—the People’s Court avoided 
the fallacy of defining a market based on users’ predicted response to a 
“small” increase in price where the prevailing price was zero. 
Instead, the People’s Court espoused a “SSNDQ” test, a variation on 
the hypothetical-monopolist test that focuses on a hypothetical “Small but 
Significant and Not-transitory [sic] Decline of Quality.”120 While this 
approach may sometimes be correct, a word of caution is needed. In many 
zero-price markets, product quality is attained primarily via sunk research-
and-development costs, while the marginal cost of delivering a high-
quality instead of a low-quality product may be minimal. Consider, for 
example, streaming online radio services. The bulk of costs relating to 
creating a high-quality user experience arise from copyright licensing fees 
and product development. The incremental cost of providing audio at 192 
kbps versus 128 kbps is relatively small.
121
 The commoditized industries 
 
 
 116. Teng Xun Gongsi yu Qi Hu Gongsi Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Jiufen An (腾讯公司与奇虎公
司不正当竞争纠纷案) [Beijing Qihoo 360 Technology Co. v. Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Co.], 
(Sup. People’s Ct. 2013) (China), translated in https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/ 
DecisionTranslation.pdf [hereinafter Beijing Qihoo]. China’s AML was modeled to some degree after 
U.S. antitrust and European competition laws, and its application in this case drew heavily from well-
established antitrust principles (including use of the HMT in market definition). For a high-level 
discussion of similarities and differences between Chinese and Western competition laws, see, e.g., 
New Chinese AntiMonopoly Law, JONES DAY COMMENTARY (Oct. 2007), http://www.jonesday.com/ 
New_Chinese_Anti-Monopoly_Law/. 
 117. Beijing Qihoo, supra note 116. The following discussion is not meant to weigh in on the 
broader question of whether the HMT is appropriate for use in non-merger contexts. For an argument 
that the HMT is not appropriate in non-merger contexts, see White, supra note 85. 
 118. Beijing Qihoo, supra note 116. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (emphasis added). Gal and Rubinfeld similarly advocate the use of a quality-focused 
analysis in at least those zero-price markets where consumers do not pay via attention or information: 
“[I]n markets in which all goods are provided for free, we suggest a variation of the SSNIP test, which 
evaluates the market boundaries by measuring the effects of small but significant and non-transitory 
changes in quality (SSNIQ).” Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 35. 
 121. Cf. Dan Rayburn, Detailing Netflix’s Streaming Costs: Average Movie Costs Five Cents to 
Deliver, STREAMINGMEDIABLOG (Mar. 17, 2009, 4:11 PM), http://blog.streamingmedia.com/2009/03 
/estimates-on-what-it-costs-netflixs-to-stream-movies.html. 
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that typified historical antitrust-enforcement actions did not exhibit this 
dynamic. Sellers of pasta, for example, could lower their costs a great deal 
by agreeing to fix semolina flour content at artificially low levels.
122
 Such 
a scheme may be profitable despite the attendant loss of customers due to 
the lowered quality of the relevant product. 
As a result, it is unlikely that firms enjoying market power in at least 
some zero-price markets would choose to exercise that power by lowering 
quality. Where doing so would result in negligible cost reduction, the 
attendant loss of customers would likely make an SSNDQ irrational—yet 
a relevant antitrust market may still be present. Consequently, SSNDQ 
tests are more appropriate where marginal costs vary substantially in 
tandem with quality levels, and less appropriate where that is not the case. 
2. Market Power 
As with market definition, the traditional tests for analyzing whether a 
firm has market power depend heavily on positive prices. For example, in 
Sherman Act § 1 claims that fall under the rule of reason,
123
 the U.S. 
Supreme Court has defined market power as “the ability to raise prices 
above those that would be charged in a competitive market.”124 In 
Sherman Act § 2 cases, the Court has defined market power as “the power 
to control prices or exclude competition.”125 In merger cases brought under 
Clayton Act § 7, courts focus on whether a transaction will “lessen 
competition,”126 but this too is typically understood as involving higher 
prices.
127
 
In a zero-price market, there is no price for a dominant firm to control. 
As a result, “[t]raditional market power analysis is not designed to apply to 
free goods.”128 It is not necessarily the case that a firm, having acquired 
 
 
 122. See Nat’l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass’n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421, 424–26 (7th Cir. 1965). 
 123. Though the text of § 1 condemns “[e]very . . . restraint of trade,” courts read the statute “as if 
the word ‘unreasonable’ appeared before ‘restraint.’” AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1500. 
Certain categories of conduct are treated as per se unreasonable; others are analyzed under the “rule of 
reason,” a broad-ranging inquiry that takes into account “how a challenged practice might restrain or 
harm competition, how it might benefit the parties and society, and whether some alternative behavior 
would be preferable.” Id. 
 124. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984). 
 125. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
 126. This language is contained in Clayton Act § 7. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 127. E.g., FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52 (D.D.C. 1998) (“Generally, under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, a prima facie case can be made if the government establishes that the 
merged entities will have a significant percentage of the relevant market—enabling them to raise 
prices above competitive levels.”). 
 128. Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 36. 
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market power in a zero-price market, will then exercise that power by 
imposing a positive price for its product.
129
 Experience and theory 
demonstrate that zero prices may remain at zero even where market shares 
shift substantially in favor of a single provider.
130
 Instead of raising prices 
to consumers, a dominant firm may be more likely to increase information 
costs, attention costs, or both, particularly in light of the Zero-Price Effect, 
discussed further infra.
131
 A similar dynamic is at play in a market where 
firms compete primarily on the amount of output they produce, which is 
sold at a single market-clearing price.
132
 In such a market, a dominant firm 
will likely exercise its market power not by directly increasing its prices, 
but by directly or indirectly (via, e.g., eliminating capacity) reducing 
output so as to raise the market-clearing price. Similarly, in zero-price 
markets, relatively more of the competitive action surrounds customer 
information and attention—at least as compared to price.133 
But the Supreme Court’s formulations of the test for market power can 
be made workable in zero-price markets if “price” is understood to be 
interchangeable with “information or attention costs.” The term “price” in 
antitrust law and economics is often understood to encompass nonprice 
features like quality. It is admittedly doubtful that the Court had 
information or attention costs in mind when formulating its various price-
focused, market-power standards. Yet the growing body of modern 
decisions overturning long-entrenched antitrust precedent stands clearly 
for the proposition that antitrust doctrines must evolve to reflect changing 
marketplace realities and economic understanding.
134
 The classic “control 
prices or exclude competition” framework for evaluating market power 
 
 
 129. Argenton and Prufer’s model follows this logic, predicting that one firm will eventually gain 
a one hundred percent share (i.e., that the market is a natural monopoly), yet assuming prices will 
remain fixed at zero. See Cédric Argenton & Jens Prüfer, Search Engine Competition with Network 
Externalities, 8 J. COMPETITION. L. & ECON. 73 (2012). 
 130. Assuming, for example, that there is a relevant market for generalized search results 
delivered to European consumers, Google has enjoyed a 90+ percent share for years, yet its price 
remains at zero. See, e.g., Editorial, Google’s Offer to Europe, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/opinion/googles-offer-to-europe.html. 
 131. See infra Part II.C. 
 132. This is a characteristic of the venerable Cournot model of competition. See, e.g., Gregory J. 
Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly 
Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719, 722 (2004) (“The usual version of the Cournot model . . . features a 
single, homogeneous product. Cournot competitors choose quantities.”). 
 133. Of course, quality and innovation competition can still occur, and may even account for the 
lion’s share of competitive efforts in a given zero-price market. The present focus, however, is on 
monetary as compared to nonmonetary exchanged costs. 
 134. E.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (overturning 
per se rule against vertical minimum price maintenance); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) 
(overturning per se rule against vertical maximum price fixing). 
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should likewise evolve to reflect the centrality of information and attention 
costs in zero-price markets. 
In practice, evaluating market power in zero-price markets will often 
be more difficult than doing so in markets with positive prices. As with 
market definition, analysis is complicated by the nature of information and 
attention costs.
135
 Furthermore, information and attention competition 
among firms is often not as robust as price competition, even in relatively 
competitive markets.
136
 In some zero-price markets, the available market-
power evidence will be less plentiful and less clear.  
The types of evidence that show market power in zero-price markets, 
however, may be the same as in positive-price markets. Evidence of actual 
anticompetitive effects should continue to be sufficient for courts to infer 
market power.
137
 Wherever possible, natural experiments—particularly 
past increases or decreases in attention or information costs, decreases in 
quality, and competitive entry or exit—should play a substantial role. 
Qualitative evidence of the inputs into a firm’s decisionmaking may also 
be valuable. 
Absent direct evidence, structural analyses of market shares and 
concentration may hold value. Where analysts rely on structural indicators 
of market power, however, they should reject arguments to the effect that 
the appropriate metric for measuring market share is always sales revenue. 
Thus, for example, the court in LiveUniverse, Inc. correctly declined to 
hold that the “appropriate measure of a firm’s share is [always] the 
quantity of goods or services actually sold to consumers.”138 Instead, the 
court adopted number of users as the market-share metric, observing that, 
“[c]arried to its logical conclusion, [the defendant’s] argument would 
mean that a company offering a free product . . . could never acquire 
market power.”139  
 
 
 135. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 136. See Newman, supra note 3, at Part III.B. 
 137. Cf. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460−61 (1986) (holding that proof of actual 
anticompetitive effects “obviate[s] the need for an inquiry into market power”). 
 138. LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV 06−6994 AHM (RZx), 2007 WL 6865852, at 
*7 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007), aff’d, 304 Fed. App’x 554 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 139. Id. 
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C. The Zero-Price Effect in Action 
A robust body of behavioral economics research points to the existence 
of the Zero Price Effect (ZPE). For ease of analysis, neoclassical 
economics often assumes that demand curves are linear. The ZPE, 
however, suggests that when prices reach zero, consumer demand 
skyrockets—even where a standard cost-benefit analysis seems to favor a 
non-zero-price alternative.
140
 
1. Substitutability of Positive- and Zero-Price Products 
Consumers’ outsized preference for zero-price products over positive-
price products tends to mean that a given zero-price product and a given 
positive-price product do not compete in the same antitrust product 
market. The ZPE creates an unexpectedly high degree of consumer 
demand for zero-price products relative to positive-price products.
141
 This 
nonlinearity complicates market-definition analyses. 
The ZPE dictates that any increase in price from zero to a positive 
amount—no matter how “small” in absolute terms—will trigger 
substantial customer substitution away from the now-positive-price 
product.
142
 As a result, the competitive action in many zero-price markets 
occurs around nonprice attributes. This is so because the ZPE influences 
rational firms’ strategic behavior. Suppose firm X decides to compete 
directly with competitor Y, whose product is priced at zero. All else being 
equal, X would be severely disadvantaged by offering its competing 
product at a positive price.
143
 X would thus either mimic the strategy that 
allows Y to offer zero prices or employ a unique strategy that will allow X 
 
 
 140. See, e.g., Kristina Shampanier et al., Zero as a Special Price: The True Value of Free 
Products, 26 MARKETING SCI. 742, 743 (2007); DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE 
HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 55–65 (2008); see also Juan L. Nicolau & Ricardo 
Sellers, The Free Breakfast Effect: An Experimental Approach to the Zero Price Model in Tourism, 
51(3) J. TRAVEL RES. 243, 244 (2012). 
 141. See Shampanier et al., supra note 140, at 742; see also John M. Newman, Copyright 
Freeconomics, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1409 (2013) (discussing the ZPE in the context of markets for 
creative works). 
 142. See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text. This is true at least where the customers are 
natural persons. See Newman, supra note 3, at 187−89 (discussing the limitations of behavioral 
economics vis-à-vis firm behavior). 
 143. Cf. Robert Bork, High-Stakes Antitrust: The Last Hurrah?, in HIGH-STAKES ANTITRUST: 
THE LAST HURRAH? 45, 55 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 2003) (“[Microsoft] was earning supracompetitive 
returns on the monopoly it was defending, while Netscape, forced to distribute its Navigator free, had 
no income in that market to cover its fixed costs. Understandably, Netscape gave up a contest it could 
not win.”). 
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to set its price at zero.
144
 This suggests that, where a given product is 
offered at zero but a second product is not, the seller of the second product 
is likely not competing directly with the seller of the first. In other words, 
the two products are likely not close substitutes. 
It is thus doubly inappropriate for courts to define markets based on a 
hypothetical increase from zero to positive prices. Where two products are 
offered at zero prices, the fact that customers would switch away from one 
product and toward the other in the event of a price increase does not 
necessarily indicate that the two belong in the same product market. Such 
switching likely reflects nothing more than the ZPE in action. Failing to 
recognize this reality is referred to herein as the “Second StreamCast 
Fallacy.” 
In the StreamCast case discussed above, the district court rejected the 
plaintiff’s proposed market definition.145 The court’s decision hinged on 
its conclusion that if the seller of a given zero-price service were to begin 
charging positive prices, users would likely switch en masse to other zero-
price services.
146
 In light of the ZPE, though, the fact that such switching 
would likely occur does not necessarily indicate close substitutability.  
The Second StreamCast Fallacy ignores practical reality: the force of 
the ZPE may cause consumers to switch to a relatively distant substitute in 
the face of a price increase. To illustrate, suppose an analyst were 
attempting to define the market that includes general online search. In the 
face of even a “small” zero-to-positive price increase by a hypothetical 
monopolist of general search, many users might substitute to remaining 
zero-price alternatives,
147
 perhaps increasing their use of URLs to navigate 
directly to websites. Yet the likelihood of such substitution does not 
necessarily indicate that the presence of URLs would discipline any 
attempt by a search monopolist to acquire, exercise, or maintain market 
power. Focusing solely on prices is misguided in zero-price markets, 
where strategic conduct centers on nonprice aspects of competition. 
 
 
 144. An objection here might be that X could overcome the ZPE by offering a highly innovative, 
better quality product. This is true. Yet it also suggests that the two products may not compete very 
directly. 
 145. StreamCast Networks, Inc. v. Skype Techs., S.A., 547 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1095–96 (C.D. Cal. 
2007). 
 146. Id. at 1095. 
 147. A similar argument is made by Kersting and Dworschak. See Christian Kersting & Sebastian 
Dworschak, “Does Google Hold a Dominant Market Position?—Addressing the (Minor) Significance 
of High Online User Shares, 16 IFO SCHNELLDIENST 7 (2014), translated in http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2495300 (“Any attempt by Google to charge a fee for search queries 
would simply result in a significant loss of users.”). 
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The Qihoo court1
148
 correctly observed the existence of—and avoided 
falling into—the Second StreamCast Fallacy. The online instant-
messaging services that constituted the relevant market in Qihoo were 
offered for “free.”149 As the court recognized, “[u]nder this business 
model, there may be a large loss in customers, which affects value-added 
services and advertising revenue. If the Internet service provider increased 
its basic service price, even if from free to [a] minor charge, this could 
affect a vast number of users.”150 More specifically, “when the instant 
messaging services are . . . free . . . and [have] become a popular business 
model . . . the user has very high price sensitivity. A price change, even 
minor, could cause a significant decline in customers.”151 Consequently, a 
SSNIP test would likely cause products to be included in the relevant 
market even where such products are distant substitutes for the candidate 
product.
152
 The Qihoo court correctly declined to apply a zero-to-positive 
SSNIP test, avoiding the Second StreamCast Fallacy. 
As a more general matter, analysts ought always to hesitate before 
concluding that a zero-price product is a close substitute for a positive-
price product. And even if case-specific evidence reveals a high degree of 
observed substitution between two such products, analysts should be wary 
of the “Cellophane Fallacy”: falsely concluding that observed substitution 
at current market prices indicates lack of market power.
153
 It may be that 
substitution is observed because the firm offering the positive-price 
product has already exercised market power to raise the price of its 
product, causing marginal customers to switch to the zero-price product. 
Conversely, it may be that the firm offering the zero-price product has 
already exercised market power to elevate the information or attention 
costs attached to its product, causing marginal customers to switch to the 
positive-price product. In either case, it would be wrong to conclude on 
 
 
 148. Teng Xun Gongsi yu Qi Hu Gongsi Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Jiufen An (腾讯公司与奇虎公
司不正当竞争纠纷案) [Beijing Qihoo 360 Technology Co. v. Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Co.], 
(Sup. People’s Ct. 2013) (China), translated in ttps://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/ 
DecisionTranslation.pdf. The Beijing Qihoo decision is discussed above. See also supra notes 117−21 
and accompanying text. 
 149. Beijing Qihoo, supra note 116. 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. (“In this case, HMT, using SSNIP, will probably include goods in the relevant market 
which may not have [a] substitutive relationship, leading to a[] . . . wide definition of the relevant 
market. Therefore, it is not suitable in this case.”). 
 153. The Cellophane Fallacy traces back to a 1956 Supreme Court decision holding that the 
defendant lacked monopoly power based on substantial observed substitution at then-current prices. 
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 403−04 (1956).  
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the basis of observed substitution alone that the two are part of the same 
product market.  
Additionally, the “Reverse Cellophane Fallacy” may come into play 
where a firm offers zero-price products as part of a temporary promotional 
campaign.
154
 The reverse Cellophane Fallacy consists of concluding that a 
firm has market power due to low observed substitution rates.
155
 A firm 
engaged in a temporary promotional campaign featuring zero-prices may 
leverage the ZPE to create low demand cross-elasticities vis-à-vis other 
firms’ products, but that firm may not enjoy long-run market power.156 
Employing the Reverse Cellophane Fallacy to conclude otherwise will 
lead to harmful false positives. 
2. Enhanced Market Power 
The competitive advantage created by the ZPE may also impact 
market-power analysis. In the U.S. tradition, supply-side substitution is 
typically treated separately from market definition.
157
 Instead, the potential 
of such substitution factors into market-power analysis under the rubric of 
“entry.”158 
Entry analysis of zero-price markets should properly account for the 
barriers to entry or expansion not only in the market for the zero-price 
product, but also in the market for the interrelated product(s).
159
 Zero 
prices tend to be offered by firms that produce multiple, interrelated 
products.
160
 Firms offering zero-price products make their profits from the 
interrelated, positive-price products they offer. If entry barriers are high in 
the interrelated product market, entry into the zero-price market may be 
unlikely—even if barriers are low in the zero-price product market 
itself.
161
 A firm attempting to enter only the zero-price market would face 
 
 
 154. See Fabio Polverino, Hunting the Wild Geese: Competition Analysis in a World of “Free,” in 
CONCORRENZA E MERCATO 545, 553 (2012) (analyzing EU competition law). 
 155. Debra J. Aron & David E. Burnstein, Regulatory Policy and the Reverse Cellophane Fallacy, 
6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 973, 987 (2010). 
 156. See Newman, supra note 3, at Part I.B (discussing “nonsustainable” strategies). 
 157. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 60, §§ 4, 9 (separating 
discussions of market-definition and entry analyses). 
 158. See id. § 9. 
 159. See Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 38 (“To be complete, barriers to the entry of as-
efficient or more efficient firms should be recognized in all affected markets.”). 
 160. See Evans, supra note 6, at 81−82. 
 161. Cf. Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 18 (“Free-standing free goods might create 
exclusionary effects that are quite similar to those of bundled free goods: creating a two-level entry 
problem, with a rival required to enter more than one market, even if it can provide a high quality 
product only in one.”). 
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a serious competitive disadvantage, since it would need to recoup its 
investment costs via charging positive prices. The ZPE suggests that many 
customers would reject any such attempt. As a result, the new entrant may 
well be foreclosed both from the interrelated-product market (due to 
barriers) and from turning a profit in the zero-price market (due to the 
ZPE). And that, in turn, could allow an incumbent to exercise market 
power, even in a market that appears on its face to have low entry 
barriers.
162
 
This raises a related question: What, if any, entry barriers exist in zero-
price markets? In America Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, for example, 
the district court concluded that it was impossible to “monopolize the 
information services market because the Internet is infinite. . . . [A]n 
entrant’s ability to participate in the market . . . is without boundary.”163 
With the benefit of hindsight, however, such reasoning appears naive. Like 
all markets, zero-price markets exhibit entry barriers, the types and 
magnitudes of which vary widely. On one end of the spectrum lie products 
like simple mobile applications, many of which are distributed at zero 
prices.
164
 Here, barriers to entry may consist of only a few thousand 
dollars and a small amount of time.
165
 At the other end of the spectrum are 
more complex products.
166
 Consider comprehensive mapping systems like 
Google Maps. Over a period of years, Google developed Maps by 
acquiring several smaller firms, compiling mapping data and satellite 
imagery, constructing specially outfitted camera cars, collecting over 20 
petabytes (21.5 billion megabytes) of street-view imagery, integrating 
ratings software, and spending untold millions on building out and 
maintaining the infrastructure necessary to deliver the service to fixed and 
mobile computing devices.
167
 Entry on a scale that would pose a 
 
 
 162. Of course, where all incumbents offer zero-price goods, the ZPE is not relevant to 
competition among those incumbents. Id. at 38. It does, however, remain relevant to potential entrants. 
 163. Am. Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F. Supp. 2d. 851, 861 (E.D. Va. 1999). 
 164. See, e.g., Carter Thomas, How Much Does It Cost to Develop an App? BLUECLOUD 
SOLUTIONS (last updated Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.bluecloudsolutions.com/blog/cost-develop-app/ 
(stating that many mobile applications (“apps”) are distributed for “free”). 
 165. See, e.g., id. (estimating that simple mobile apps cost between $1,000–4,000 to develop). 
 166. In one recent decision, the court dismissed a class-action consumer complaint alleging that 
Google restrained trade in the “Internet search” market. Feitelson v. Google, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 
1023, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2015). The plaintiffs alleged that “search engines . . . require significant 
infrastructure in the form of physical plants backed by significant financial and computational 
resources, as well as continuous programming support for the algorithms and software that support the 
search engine, and the ability to manage search on a global scale.” Id. at 1023. 
 167. See Leo Kelion, Google Maps Uses Ground Truth Project to Battle Apple, BBC NEWS (Sept. 
10, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-19536269. 
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meaningful competitive constraint would require similar outlays and time 
(at least given current available technology). 
In addition to fixed development costs, network effects may serve to 
discourage entry in zero-price markets. At least one court has refused to 
dismiss a complaint where the plaintiff alleged that network effects were a 
formidable barrier to entering a zero-price market.
168
 Some economists 
conclude that search markets, currently dominated by zero-price products, 
exhibit such effects.
169
 
C. Defenses: The “Free-Goods” Argument 
The presence of zero-price goods and services tends to signal the 
existence of interrelated products that subsidize the zero-price offerings.
170
 
This function of zero-price markets can open the door for a novel 
argument from defendants: that imposing a restraint on one side of a two-
sided platform was necessary for offering a “free” product to consumers 
on the other side of the platform. Creative though it may be, the “free-
goods defense” should fail as a matter of antitrust law and economics.171 
In United States v. American Express Co.,
172
 the district court correctly 
rejected a free-goods defense. American Express operated a credit-card 
network that functioned as a two-sided platform.
173
 On one side of the 
 
 
 168. See LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV 06−6994 AHM (RZx), 2007 WL 6865852, 
at *8, 9 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007) (refusing to dismiss a complaint on market-power grounds, in part 
because the plaintiff alleged that “in the market for Internet-based social networking websites, network 
effects occur largely due to the ‘user-generated nature’ of the content on those websites”). 
 169. See generally, e.g., Argenton & Prüfer, supra note 121 (arguing that users of Internet search 
engines do not account for the fact that search providers will—by virtue of the use—acquire private 
information that can then be used to increase the quality of future searches, thus creating indirect 
network externalities on the user side of the market). 
 170. See supra Part II.B.2; Evans, supra note 6, at 86. 
 171. Gal and Rubinfeld observe that “free goods that are part of a strategy of increasing profits in 
another market . . . raise an important question: whether harm to one group of consumers might be 
justified by a larger benefit to another group of consumers, in another market.” They “suggest adopting 
a rule which allows for some balancing.” Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 40. This suggestion 
appears to contemplate a different situation (some harm to some customers allows a greater amount of 
benefits to other customers) than the type addressed herein—where, at most, the defendant is passing 
through all of the supracompetitive profits it is earning in one market to its customers in another 
market. 
 172. 88 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). To the extent it is relevant, the author represented the 
United States in this matter. The discussion contained in this Article draws solely on public 
information; it does not relate to or reveal any confidential information. Again, the views expressed 
herein are purely the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of 
Justice. 
 173. That payment networks are two-sided is well-established among industrial-organization 
economists. For the seminal paper on the topic, see Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Cooperation 
Among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations, 33 RAND J. ECON. 549 (2002). 
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platform were merchants, who paid fees to the networks in exchange for 
the ability to accept credit-card payments from card-holding consumers.
174
 
On the other side of the platform were the card-holders.
175
 
American Express’s contracts with merchants contained what it called 
“non-discrimination provisions” (NDPs).176 The NDPs “prevent[ed] the 
roughly 3.4 million merchants who accept American Express credit and 
charge cards from steering customers to alternative credit card brands, 
such as Visa, MasterCard, and Discover.”177 Thus, for example, a 
merchant could not “offer[] a 10% discount for using a Visa card, free 
shipping for using a Discover card, or a free night at a hotel for using an 
American Express card.”178 
The district court held that the NDPs restrained competition. 
Specifically, the NDPs did so by “creat[ing] an environment in which 
there is nothing to offset credit card networks’ incentives—including 
American Express’s incentive—to charge merchants inflated prices for 
their services.”179 Merchants, in turn, passed these higher costs on to all of 
their customers.
180
 
In support of the NDPs, American Express raised the free-goods 
defense. American Express argued that the NDPs were necessary to fund 
American Express’s “superior” card-holder rewards program.181 As a 
general matter, consumers can access credit-card services for a price of 
zero—“indeed, many are essentially charged a negative price in the form 
of loyalty points or other rewards.”182 Thus, American Express was 
 
 
 174. Am. Express, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 150 (“Each time a customer uses a credit card, the merchant, 
in one way or another, pays a fee to the network services provider that facilitates the customer's 
purchase.”). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 149. Visa and MasterCard historically imposed similar rules, and the Government’s 
initial complaint named Visa and MasterCard as well as Amex. See id. Both Visa and MasterCard 
settled without going to trial. See id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Justice 
Department Sues American Express, MasterCard and Visa to Eliminate Rules Restricting Price 
Competition; Reaches Settlement with Visa and Mastercard” (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2010/October/10-at-1115.html. 
 177. Am. Express, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 149–50. 
 178. Id. at 150. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 21 F. Supp. 3d 187, 192–93 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (denying 
summary judgment) (“Defendants state that their higher fees can be explained because. . . . Defendants 
. . . offer cardmember rewards and benefits that they argue are superior to those of other credit card 
companies.”); Christie Smythe, AmEx Executive Defends High-Fee Model as Competitive Edge, 
BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2014, 5:25 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-28/amex-executive-
defends-high-fee-model-as-competitive-edge.html (“AmEx says . . . that its high-fee model, protected 
by its rules, allows it to offer generous rewards.”). 
 182. Newman, supra note 3, at 156.  
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arguing that its NDPs were necessary for it to continue offering zero- or 
negative-price products—i.e., free goods—to consumers.183 While the 
argument may hold some emotional appeal,
184
 the district court rejected it 
on both legal and factual grounds.
185
  
This outcome was correct. It is an ancient tenet of the law that 
disposing of ill-gotten gains in an admirable manner is no defense.
186
 
Robin Hood has no place in antitrust doctrine, wherein competition, rather 
than vigilantism, is the chosen means of optimally distributing 
resources.
187
 Even if a dominant firm were to pass 100 percent of its 
supracompetitive profits on to consumers in the form of free products, 
such “altruism” ought not give rise to a legal defense. 
Antitrust economics here aligns with legal doctrine. At least since the 
impact of the Chicago School was first felt in the 1970s and 1980s,
188
 and 
arguably earlier,
189
 antitrust law has been substantially (and some would 
argue primarily) concerned with allocative efficiency. Even assuming 100 
percent pass-through in the form of free products, restraints on trade may 
still create allocative inefficiencies, regardless of whether the net output of 
a platform increases or decreases.  
To use operating systems (OSs) as an example, assume that a 
monopolist controlling 100% of OS platforms were to impose a restraint 
of trade on application developers. Suppose further that the restraint 
allowed the monopolist to charge those developers supracompetitive 
prices for access to the OS (i.e., for the ability to develop programs 
 
 
 183. Am. Express, 88 F. Supp. 3d. at 226.  
 184. Id. at 227 (calling American Express’s proferred justification “perhaps intuitively 
appealing”). 
 185. Id. (“Defendants’ putative justification is inconsistent with both the law and the factual 
record.”). 
 186. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Justice is 
not served by inflicting injustice. The ends do not justify the means. There is no ‘Robin Hood’ defense 
to illegal and wrongful conduct.”); cf. Microsoft Corp. v. Comput. Support Servs. of Carolina, Inc., 
123 F. Supp. 2d 945, 950 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (rejecting argument that alleged theft of a competitor’s 
intellectual property was appropriate in light of competitor’s alleged anticompetitive conduct). 
 187. See FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423 (1990) (condemning fee-
fixing agreement among lawyers, despite the possibility that “the quality of representation may 
improve when rates are increased”); see also Jon Polenberg, Comment, tfosorciM and croMiftos: Why 
High-Technology Antitrust Inquiry Is Backwards and Inside-Out, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1275, 1294 
(2003) (“Robin Hood is guilty of theft. Whether he is performing his theft under the guise of providing 
for the poor does not change the illegality of his acts. The illegality and serving-the-poor inquiries are 
separate and should stay that way.”). 
 188. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 215 (1985) 
(“The Chicago School model of antitrust policy dictates that allocative efficiency as defined by the 
market should be the only goal of the antitrust laws.”). 
 189. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (referring to “allocation” of 
economic resources). 
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compatible with the OS). Finally, suppose that the monopolist were to pass 
through 100% of those rents to users, in the form of zero-price OSs.  
In this scenario, the restraint would cause a higher number of users to 
demand OSs, putting upward pressure on OS output. Users would, in 
isolation, benefit from this scenario; it is that benefit that supposedly 
justifies the free-goods defense. But the restraint would also cause a lower 
number of developers to create programs for the OS, putting downward 
pressure on OS output. 
Crucially, the restraint would create allocative inefficiencies regardless 
of whether net output of the OS were to increase or decrease. Society 
would devote an inefficiently low amount of resources to producing 
applications; it would also devote an inefficiently high amount of 
resources to consuming OSs. Antitrust law condemns such outcomes. At 
the core of the antitrust enterprise lies the assumption that unrestrained 
competitive forces, not the whims of firms with market power, “yield the 
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest 
quality and the greatest material progress.”190 
E. Damages Valuations 
Valuing damages for antitrust harms is often difficult, but it is also 
essential. First, and most obviously, courts awarding damages to private 
plaintiffs must arrive at some valuation to make the awards. Second, 
private litigants deciding whether to settle must estimate the size of a 
potential damages award, discounted by the probability of liability. Third, 
public enforcement agencies must estimate harm in order to apply an 
error-cost framework to decide whether to seek a remedy for potential 
violations.  
In the United States, private plaintiffs (but not the Government)
191
 may 
recover monetary damages if they successfully prove an antitrust 
violation. Having proved an antitrust injury that caused them harm, 
antitrust plaintiffs still bear the burden of establishing the amount of 
damages. The basic objective when calculating antitrust damages is to 
make the plaintiff whole—to recreate the world as it would have existed 
had the defendant not violated the antitrust laws.
192
 
 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. In 2011, the Antitrust Division for the first time obtained court approval for a settlement 
involving disgorgement of the defendant’s profits. United States v. Keyspan Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 
633 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Damages, however, remain unavailable to public enforcers. 
 192. In antitrust law, actual damages awards, once calculated, are trebled. The goals of the 
additional 200 percent windfall have been stated as, variously, incentivizing private antitrust 
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As the Court has observed, “[t]he vagaries of the marketplace usually 
deny us sure knowledge of what plaintiff’s situation would have been in 
the absence of the defendant’s antitrust violation.”193 Yet, the equitable 
intuition is that it would be unjust to allow defendants to escape liability 
by insisting that plaintiffs prove with specificity the amount of harm the 
defendants themselves inflicted.
194
 These principles have led courts to 
apply a fairly relaxed standard to private antitrust plaintiffs attempting to 
prove the amount of their damages claims.
195
 
1. Monetary Damages in Zero-Price Markets 
In zero-price markets, quantifying antitrust damages with a high degree 
of accuracy will generally be difficult. The “vagaries of the marketplace” 
noted by the Court in 1981 are no less present in modern zero-price 
settings. They may well be more intractable today.  
To the extent customers seek damages for harms from attentional or 
informational overcharges, the complexity of proof increases significantly. 
For all the reasons that economists use price as an easy stand-in for more 
complicated competitive functions like quality or innovation—and 
because damages (like prices) comprise money—prices also facilitate 
damages calculations. 
The shift to zero-price markets can thus take antitrust damages 
calculations away from an accounting-style exercise and toward something 
more akin to measuring damages for pain and suffering or loss of 
consortium. That shift is potentially problematic. Damages awards for 
such nonmonetary harms, and for pain and suffering in particular, have 
been heavily criticized as allowing judges and (especially) juries too much 
discretion. And in the antitrust field, juries have already become the object 
of much skepticism.
196
 
 
 
enforcement. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (“By offering potential 
litigants the prospect of a recovery in three times the amount of their damages, Congress encouraged 
these persons to serve as ‘private attorneys general.’”); deterring anticompetitive conduct, see Illinois 
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977); and dispossessing violators of “the fruits of their 
illegality,” see Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968). 
 193. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566 (1981). 
 194. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. of New York v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 
(1927) (“[A] defendant whose wrongful conduct has rendered difficult the ascertainment of the precise 
damages suffered by the plaintiff, [sic] is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with 
the same exactness and precision as would otherwise be possible.”). 
 195. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931). 
 196. See generally Daniel A. Crane, The Much-Maligned Antitrust Jury, in THE INSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 109 (2011) (“No U.S. antitrust institution is more maligned 
than the jury.”); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 4 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 49 Newman book pages 12/13/2016  
 
 
 
 
 
84 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:49 
 
 
 
 
Thus, on the one hand, accurately calculating damages awards in 
antitrust cases involving zero-price markets may be quite difficult. The 
nature of the harms to be remedied may require nonspecialist judges and 
juries to exercise a greater-than-ideal degree of discretion. On the other 
hand, the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out decades ago that “[t]he constant 
tendency of the courts is to find some way in which damages can be 
awarded where a wrong has been done,” and that “[d]ifficulty of 
ascertainment is no longer confused with right of recovery for a proven 
invasion of the plaintiff’s rights.”197 
2. Damages-Valuation Approaches 
The questions of whether and how to grant antitrust damages in zero-
price markets thus depend on whether some workable, if inexact, metric 
can be used to quantify the harm to be remedied. One such metric, 
proposed herein, is the “marketplace valuation” method. This metric 
contains an inherent shortcoming, yet alternative damages-calculation 
methods exhibit unique deficiencies that render them much more 
unreliable. 
a. Marketplace Valuation 
The marketplace-valuation approach would look to the per-unit value 
of the relevant information or attention to either the defendant (if used 
internally) or the third-party customers who buy the information or 
attention.
198
 The per-unit value is then multiplied by the number of units of 
information or attention that constitutes the violation-related overcharge.  
 
 
(2005) (“Jury trials in front of intelligent but nonspecialist judges is a truly miserable way to make 
economic policy.”). Hovenkamp contends that neither of the two functions juries traditionally serve in 
the U.S. judicial system—evaluating the veracity of witness testimony and delineating community 
moral standards—are relevant in the antitrust context. Id. at 48. 
 197. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) (quoting Story Parchment 
Co., 282 U.S. at 565) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 198. A somewhat analogous damages-calculation method is the “factor income” or “derived 
value” approach sometimes used to measure harm to natural resources. This approach “is used as a 
means of valuation in applications where natural resources are used as inputs in the production of other 
goods and services.” C.A. Ulibarri & K.F. Wellman, Natural Resource Valuation: A Primer on 
Concepts and Techniques 23, prepared for U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (1997). It considers the increase in 
costs due to the natural-resource harm—holding all else constant—that are incurred by the firm(s) who 
use the natural resource as a production input. Id. at 23−24. 
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To illustrate, suppose that firm A competes with several rivals in the 
market for online social-scrapbooking platforms.
199
 A’s scrapbooking 
service is a zero-price product as to users, who pay via attention costs by 
viewing advertisements while using the service. A makes its revenue by 
selling advertising space to third parties.
200
 A is able to sell 100 units of 
advertising to third parties at the competitive per-unit price of $1. 
Suppose now that A acquires a monopoly and exercises its power by 
engaging in exclusionary conduct that allows A to extract from consumers 
more attention costs than it could have gained otherwise. A is now able to 
sell 110 units of advertising to third parties at a per-unit price of $1. 
Though the price to users remains zero, users incur relatively higher 
attention costs. Under the marketplace-valuation approach, the measure of 
harm is the difference between the amount actually paid by advertisers and 
the amount they would have paid A if A had not engaged in the 
anticompetitive conduct: $10.  
The marketplace-valuation approach thus incorporates the actual 
marketplace value of attention. Its primary advantage is objectivity: the 
“relevant data” on which triers of fact could base a “just and reasonable 
estimate” of harm201 comprises revealed preferences by actual market 
participants.  
But this approach is inexact. As the above example indicates, it is a 
measure of what the attention was worth to advertisers, not necessarily the 
attention costs to consumers. To continue the example, suppose that a 
massive recession causes all of A’s advertisers to lower the per-unit price 
they are willing to pay for users’ attention from $1 to $0.90, but does not 
affect consumers’ willingness to incur attention costs in exchange for 
using P’s service.202 Going forward, A, which retains its monopoly status, 
could keep the attention-cost level on the consumer side constant at 110 
units. Thus, consumers would experience the same effective amount of 
attention costs: the amount of harm would remain constant. Yet the 
 
 
 199. This example is not meant to suggest that the Internet-based scrapbooking platform market is 
a relevant antitrust market, or that any particular firm wields market power in that market. 
 200. A real-life online scrapbooking platform, Pinterest, generated its first revenue by introducing 
advertising to the user experience. See Douglas MacMillan, Pinterest CEO Lays Out Growth Plan, 
Sees Revenue in 2014, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2014, 2:56 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304027204579334651169493632. 
 201. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 124 (1969) (quoting Bigelow v. 
RKO Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264−65 (1946)). 
 202. In fact, a recession might increase consumers’ willingness to incur attention costs by 
decreasing the amount of money available to the consumers for discretionary spending. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 49 Newman book pages 12/13/2016  
 
 
 
 
 
86 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:49 
 
 
 
 
amount actually paid by advertisers—the variable used to calculate 
damages—would decrease.  
Depending on the contours of the particular market at issue, variant 
market-based valuation methods are available, though they tend to suffer 
from similar defects. Consumers of the zero-price version of freemium 
products, for example, may point to the positive-price version of the 
relevant product as the appropriate metric for measuring damages.
203
 To 
illustrate, suppose a firm were to offer two versions of the same service: a 
zero-price option that allowed the firm to collect personal information 
from users and a positive-price option that did not.
204
 Users of the zero-
price version might argue that the amounts paid by positive-price users 
represent the value of the information. But this argument is not quite 
correct—those amounts represent the value to a different user group of not 
surrendering their information, and different individuals attach varying 
values to their personal information.
205
 
Such market-based valuation metrics are decoupled from actual harm 
as compared to the more traditional price-based damages-calculation 
metrics. But the ultimate question in awarding damages is not whether this 
(or any other) measure is mathematically exact. Antitrust plaintiffs have 
“an obligation to come forward with the best, most accurate measure of 
damages that is reasonably available.”206 The marketplace-valuation 
metric is based on what the actual exchanged attention or information 
costs were worth in an actual marketplace, or what avoiding the costs was 
worth to some set of actual customers. It thus exhibits at least some degree 
of objectivity and depends on revealed, not stated, preferences—a crucial 
advantage, given the unique shortcomings of stated preferences in zero-
price markets. 
b. Stated Preferences and Cognitive Biases 
Other metrics might be used to attempt to measure more directly the 
value of attention and information costs to consumers. Plaintiffs could, for 
 
 
 203. This basic business model (“freemium”) is already widely used with advertising-supported 
services. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 3, at 157. 
 204. This hypothetical is not far-fetched—in 2015, AT&T announced a new fiber-optic Internet 
service that allowed users to pay an additional $29 per month to “avoid being tracked” while using the 
service. See Elizabeth Dwoskin & Thomas Gryta, AT&T Offers Data Privacy—for a Price, WALL ST. 
J. (Feb. 18, 2015, 6:01 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/02/18/att-offers-data-privacy-for-a-price/ 
?mod=WSJ_TechWSJD_NeedToKnow. 
 205. See Newman, supra note 3, at 181. 
 206. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc. v. Gen. Cinema Corp., 748 F. Supp. 1399, 1406 (D. Ariz. 
1990); accord S. Pac. Commc’ns Co. v. AT&T, 556 F. Supp. 825, 1090 (D.D.C. 1960). 
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example, introduce survey evidence purporting to quantify that value 
based on respondents’ answers to a questionnaire. Conducting and 
analyzing such studies has become increasingly commonplace in the 
environmental-law context,
207
 where this methodology is known as the 
“contingent valuation” approach.208 Survey research, however, consists of 
stated preferences. Stated preferences (what people say they want) stand in 
contrast to revealed preferences (what people actually want, as 
demonstrated by real-world behavior).
209
 And neoclassical economics—
which provides the backbone of modern antitrust economics—strongly 
favors analysis based on revealed, rather than stated, preferences.
210
  
Myriad cognitive biases and limitations put an upward bound on how 
accurately respondents can answer questions about the monetary value of 
attention and information costs. Research in this area shows a divide 
between perceived and actual costs—between stated and revealed 
preferences.  
When asked about their preferences, individuals appear to overestimate 
their sensitivity to information costs. Thus, for example, “Americans say 
they are deeply concerned about privacy on the web and their 
cellphones. . . . Yet they keep using the services and handing over their 
personal information.”211 When asked, consumers voice their support for 
privacy-protection measures—but their “concern appears to have had little 
discernible impact on [their] shopping behaviors.”212 Researchers have 
 
 
 207. See Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 609, 656 (2014) (“Because of the prevalence of difficult-to-measure goods in the environmental 
field, ‘[i]t is hard to overestimate the central importance of contingent valuation to modern 
environmental economics.’” (quoting Richard T. Carson & W. Michael Hanemann, Contingent 
Valuation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 821, 826 (Karl-Göran Mäler & Jeffrey 
R. Vincent eds., 2005)). 
 208. See Ulibarri & Wellman, supra note 198, at 25 (“The most obvious way to measure 
nonmarket values is to ask people how much they would be willing to pay for the resource or avoid 
any damages that might be sustained by the resource.”). 
 209. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering 
Wound, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 673, 701 n.99 (2013) (“Economists speak of ‘revealed preferences.’ They 
maintain that people’s preferences are shown, not by what they say, but by what they do.”). 
 210. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its 
Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2012) (stating 
that “neoclassical economic theory depends” on “the link between revealed preference and individual 
welfare”). 
 211. Claire Cain Miller, Americans Say They Want Privacy, but Act As if They Don’t, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/upshot/americans-say-they-want-privacy-but-
act-as-if-they-dont.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1. 
 212. Joseph Phelps, Glen Nowak & Elizabeth Ferrell, Privacy Concerns and Consumer 
Willingness to Provide Personal Information, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 27, 27 (2000). 
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dubbed this the “privacy paradox.”213 Empirical research indicates that the 
gap is substantial. In one study, individuals stated their willingness to 
disclose an average of 8.7 items of personal information—yet, several 
weeks later, actually disclosed nearly twice that number.
214
 When it comes 
to information costs, individuals “say one thing (intend to limit disclosure) 
and then do another (actually provide personal details).”215 
On the other hand, individuals appear to underestimate attention costs. 
One study showed that Internet users as a whole believe online 
advertisements to be “almost completely ineffective.”216 In fact, almost 
half of users reported that advertisements have “no effect whatsoever,” 
stating a belief that they were essentially invulnerable to advertisements.
217
 
This belief was incorrect. Follow-up experiments involving anagram word 
problems surrounded by varying numbers and types of advertisements 
demonstrated that “peripheral ads had substantial persuasive and subtle 
distracting effects.”218 In short, research shows that “consumers 
underestimate the effects that on-line advertisements have on them.”219 
There are vagaries inherent in any of these valuation methodologies. 
The pronounced divergence between stated and revealed preferences 
regarding information and attention costs, however, ought to make courts 
particularly wary of placing much weight on contingent valuations in 
antitrust cases involving zero-price markets.  
3. Disgorgement as an Alternative to Damages 
Disgorgement, an equitable remedy that transfers an undeserved 
benefit from a defendant to a plaintiff (or class), may serve as an 
alternative to awarding damages for some antitrust harms involving zero-
price markets. Disgorgement does not require plaintiffs to offer a 
calculation of harm.
220
 Although disgorgement has rarely been invoked in 
litigated antitrust cases, “there is surprisingly little doubt that equitable 
antitrust remedies include requiring violators to disgorge any illegally 
 
 
 213. Patricia A. Norberg, Daniel R. Horne & David A. Horne, The Privacy Paradox: Personal 
Information Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 100 (2007). 
 214. Id. at 112–13. These results were observed in a fairly small sample size, twenty-three 
individuals. Id. at 110. 
 215. Id. at 101. 
 216. Brad J. Sagarin et al., Bartering Our Attention: The Distraction and Persuasion Effects of 
On-Line Advertisements, 8 COGNITIVE TECH. 4, 5 (2003). 
 217. Id. at 5. 
 218. Id. at 14. 
 219. Id. at 16. 
 220. See Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 81 (2009). 
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obtained profits.”221 The FTC has successfully sought disgorgement as an 
antitrust remedy in a handful of cases.
222
 And, for the first time in 2011, 
the Department of Justice successfully pursued disgorgement as a remedy 
for a Sherman Act violation.
223
  
Disgorgement offers both advantages and disadvantages as compared 
to awarding damages. The immediate advantage is that of demonstrability. 
As Elhauge points out, “even where this [disgorgement] analysis is 
difficult, it may well be easier to calculate the amount of illicit profits than 
it is to calculate the amount of harm to each victim.”224 This is doubly true 
in the zero-price context: although the relevant harms may be 
nonmonetary, defendants’ profits will always be expressed in dollar terms. 
On the other hand, disgorgement explicitly does not seek to compensate 
victims for their injuries. And in the antitrust context, the important 
functions served by the trebling of damages go unmet where courts apply 
only equitable remedies (like disgorgement). Yet despite these limitations, 
where zero prices render damages calculations impossible or overly 
unreliable, disgorgement may be the next-best option. 
4. The Role of Public Enforcement 
In some instances, no measure of damages may be reasonably 
available. Given finite resources, antitrust plaintiffs may not be able to 
offer a damages valuation that meets even the relaxed standard for 
antitrust damages. Even well-heeled plaintiffs may struggle to untangle 
complex zero-price business models. Accordingly, damages valuations 
submitted in zero-price contexts may veer into the mere “speculation or 
guesswork” condemned by the U.S. Supreme Court.225 
As a result, public antitrust enforcers should pay special attention to 
such markets. Where proving damages is unworkable, injunctive relief 
remains available. The reality, however, is that private antitrust 
enforcement would be nearly nonexistent absent the prospect of damages 
for successful plaintiffs. Private plaintiffs often are best situated to detect 
antitrust violations.
226
 Yet, in complex zero-price scenarios, there is a real 
 
 
 221. Id. at 79. 
 222. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 286 n.11 
(2007) (collecting cases). 
 223. See generally United States v. Keyspan Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 224. Elhauge, Disgorgement, supra note 220, at 81. 
 225. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946). 
 226. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (“Congress created the treble-damages 
remedy . . . precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust violations. These 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 49 Newman book pages 12/13/2016  
 
 
 
 
 
90 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:49 
 
 
 
 
danger that the relatively dismal prospects of damages recovery will, in 
practice, prevent any private enforcement, thereby leaving such markets 
under-policed. Public antitrust enforcement is most crucial in markets 
where private enforcement is least likely to be effective. 
III. ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT IN ZERO-PRICE MARKETS 
The discussion turns now to the particular types of strategic conduct 
that have been, are, or may soon be challenged in zero-price markets. As 
to each category of conduct, this Part is, by turns, both descriptive and 
prescriptive. Each Subpart attempts to collect and report objectively all 
extant case law involving the particular type of conduct addressed. Where 
no case law yet exists, illustrative hypotheticals are posed. Additionally, 
normative critique of courts’ decision-making is woven into each 
discussion: errors and potential pitfalls are identified, and guidance for 
future analyses is offered. 
A. Price and Cost Fixing 
Horizontal cartel activity has long been at the core of antitrust 
liability.
227
 Because of their high likelihood of causing anticompetitive 
harm, agreements among direct competitors that involve naked price 
fixing, joint output limitation, and market-allocation are generally treated 
as per se illegal.
228
 This per se rule “condemns conduct without proof of 
power, effect, or purpose and without hearing claims of legitimate 
objectives.”229 Conspiring competitors may face hefty fines and even 
prison sentences.  
Zero-price markets present two challenges for the treatment of 
horizontal agreements. First, should agreements among horizontal 
competitors to fix the price of a product at zero be treated similarly to 
agreements to fix positive prices—i.e., should horizontal zero-price-fixing 
 
 
private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the Department of 
Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations.”). 
 227. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has 
Come?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 777, 798 (1987) (referring to “an inner core of antitrust cases, for example, 
those involving horizontal price-fixing, where liability is unambiguous”). 
 228. This treatment is justified by basic economic theory. A group of firms acting together faces 
the same incentive to raise prices and reduce output as a single-firm monopolist. And an agreement to 
act jointly is a quick and low-cost way to acquire market power relative to the aggressive competition 
or predatory conduct required of a single firm wishing to acquire such power. 
 229. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1509a. 
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be per se illegal? Second, how should antitrust law address horizontal 
agreements to fix attention or information cost levels?  
1. Zero-Price Fixing 
If horizontal cartel activity lies at the core of antitrust liability, then 
horizontal price fixing lies at the very heart of that core. As the leading 
treatise observes, the rationale for treating horizontal price fixing that is 
not ancillary to joint productive activity
230
 as per se illegal hinges on both 
the high likelihood that such price-fixing will impose anticompetitive 
harms and the low likelihood that it will yield net social benefits.
231
 The 
consensus is that any “conceivable social benefits are few in principle, 
small in magnitude, speculative in occurrence, and always premised on the 
existence of price-fixing power that is likely to be exercised adversely to 
the public.”232 
Horizontal zero-price fixing challenges the consensus view. The 
likelihood that such price fixing will impose anticompetitive harms or 
yield social benefits varies greatly depending on the market context of the 
challenged agreement. More specifically, supplier agreements to set 
customer-facing prices at zero create little risk of harm and a high 
likelihood of societal benefits. But agreements among buyers to fix prices 
to suppliers at zero carries a relatively high risk of harm and low 
likelihood of societal benefits. Antitrust rules, thus, ought to be lenient 
toward the former and wary of the latter. 
When suppliers agree to set customer-facing prices at zero, the core 
concern motivating the per se rule against horizontal price fixing—that 
competitors will set prices higher than the competitive level, reducing 
output and harming customers—is ameliorated. As Gal and Rubinfeld 
suggest, “the motivation to supply a free good plays a significant role . . . 
it is a helpful and efficient first step when analyzing the welfare effects of 
free goods.”233 An agreement among suppliers to set prices at zero is less 
likely than an agreement to set prices at some positive level to be 
 
 
 230. Id. The per se prohibition of horizontal price fixing is not universal. As discussed further 
infra note 242, Broadcast Music carved out an exception from the per se rule against naked horizontal 
price fixing for restraints of trade that facilitate joint productive activity that would not have otherwise 
occurred. 
 231. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1509a. 
 232. Id. ¶ 1509a. 
 233. Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 31. 
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motivated by the lure of supracompetitive profits.
234
 And unlike maximum 
price fixing, there is generally no danger that the “ceiling” will serve also 
as a de facto “floor.” Unless sellers had been charging negative prices—
paying customers to take their products—imposing fixed zero prices 
without more is an unalloyed good. Since negative prices are quite rare in 
practice, the likelihood of harm is also rare. Furthermore, as discussed 
further below, the conceivable social benefits yielded by horizontal zero-
price fixing agreements are relatively greater in number and magnitude, 
and less speculative in nature than those attendant to similar agreements in 
positive-price markets.
235
 These differences militate against treating 
horizontal zero-price fixing by suppliers as per se illegal.
236
 Such 
agreements are to be distinguished, however, from other supplier cartel 
agreements (e.g., market-allocation agreements) that merely happen to 
involve zero-price products.
237
  
Wallace v. IBM
238
 provides an instructive example of benign (and, 
indeed, beneficial) horizontal zero-price fixing agreements among 
suppliers. Wallace involved an allegation of horizontal zero-price fixing 
by suppliers. Linux, an open-source OS, was distributed under the GNU 
General Public License (GPL). Among other things, the GPL allowed 
users to prepare—but prevented them from charging positive prices for—
derivative works.
239
 The plaintiff wanted to compete with Linux by 
creating a derivative of it or an entirely new OS; he contended that various 
entities involved in the Linux project had conspired to prevent such 
competition “by making Linux available at an unbeatable price.”240 Yet as 
Bond points out, “the GPL coordinates the work of thousands of 
programmers, with at least thousands looking to download the software 
 
 
 234. See Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 8 (“[I]t is important to realize that a growing number 
of goods are provided free of charge based on motivations that are intrinsic and not purely 
economic.”). 
 235. Cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 93 (“[B]ecause of the pervasively 
innovative character of platform software markets, tying in such markets may produce efficiencies that 
courts have not previously encountered and thus the Supreme Court had not factored into the per se 
rule as originally conceived.”). 
 236. Cf. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1509a. 
 237. Thus, for example, a district court applied the per se rule to a territorial market-allocation 
scheme involving the provision of online Yellow Pages services. The fact that the defendants used an 
ad-supported zero-price delivery model did not ameliorate the likely purpose and effect of the 
agreement. See GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 27, 44−45 (D.D.C. 
1998). 
 238. Wallace v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 467 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 239. Id. at 1105. 
 240. Id. at 1106. 
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that they produce.”241 Thus, the GPL was ancillary to joint productive 
activity, much like the blanket licenses at issue in Broadcast Music.
242
 In 
fact, by eliminating the requirement of payment altogether, the GPL may 
have done even more to reduce transaction costs than did the blanket 
licenses in Broadcast Music. Seeing no evil—and much good—in the 
GPL, Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit, affirmed the trial 
court’s dismissal of Wallace’s complaint.243  
Agreements by buyers to fix supplier-facing prices at zero carry with 
them a much greater potential risk of harm than supplier agreements like 
the GPL in Wallace. Because buyer-side zero-price fixing agreements tend 
to lower costs, they are likely motivated by desire to extract 
supracompetitive profits.
244
 At the same time, such agreements are less 
likely to be motivated primarily by the desire to engage in joint productive 
activity that would not be possible absent agreement.  
The NCAA’s rules forbidding certain forms of student-athlete 
compensation at issue in O’Bannon v. NCAA245 can be analyzed as an 
example of buyer-side horizontal zero-price fixing.
246
 The NCAA, a 
cooperative joint venture, was established to regulate intercollegiate 
sports.
247
 At issue in O’Bannon were NCAA-promulgated rules that 
prevented member schools from (among other things) compensating 
student-athletes “for the use of their names, images, and likenesses” in 
various media.
248
 Essentially, as the district court pointed out, “the schools 
agree[d] to value [such uses] at zero by agreeing not to compete with each 
 
 
 241. Heidi S. Bond, Note, What’s So Great About Nothing? The GNU General Public License and 
the Zero-Price-Fixing Problem, 104 MICH. L. REV. 547, 559 (2005). 
 242. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), the U.S. 
Supreme Court applied a rule of reason analysis to a blanket-licensing scheme created by two joint 
ventures, ASCAP and BMI. Broadcast-radio stations wanted to play copyrighted songs; individual 
composers wanted their songs to be played. Id. at 4−6. Yet transacting on an individualized basis 
would be ruinously time-consuming. Id. at 5. ASCAP and BMI solved this market failure by creating a 
blanket license: stations could play any song in ASCAP and BMI’s libraries in exchange for a small 
license fee, fixed by the joint ventures. Id. Thus, although the blanket licenses comprised horizontal 
price-fixing agreements, the price-fixing was ancillary to joint productive activity (creating substantial 
net benefits for society) and received rule-of-reason treatment as a result. Id. at 22−24. 
 243. Wallace v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 467 F.2d. at 1107−08. 
 244. Again, when it comes to designing antitrust rules to address zero-price products (“free 
goods”), motives matter. See Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 31. 
 245. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 246. The court generally characterized the schools as sellers in the “college education market,” but 
recognized that the NCAA student recruits “could also be characterized as sellers in an almost 
identical market for their athletic services and licensing rights.” Id. at 973. 
 247. Id. at 963. 
 248. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 49 Newman book pages 12/13/2016  
 
 
 
 
 
94 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:49 
 
 
 
 
other.”249 Though the NCAA contended that its zero-price fixing created 
unique social benefits,
250
 the court—applying a rule-of-reason analysis—
concluded that the challenged rules yielded only “limited procompetitive 
benefits” that could have been achieved through less restrictive means.251 
The Ninth Circuit largely affirmed the district court’s opinion, holding that 
the schools’ agreement “to value the athletes’ NILs at zero” was 
anticompetitive.
252
 
O’Bannon demonstrates that buyer agreements to fix prices at zero may 
be anticompetitive. But per se rules are applied to ban certain types of 
anticompetitive conduct only when courts have developed enough 
institutional experience analyzing such conduct to conclude with 
confidence that it carries a high likelihood of harm and low likelihood of 
benefits.
253
 Whatever the merits (if any) of applying the per se rule to 
horizontal zero-price fixing, courts currently have insufficient experience 
with such agreements to justify such a rule. The rule of reason offers 
courts—like those that issued the O’Bannon decisions—the flexibility 
needed to avoid condemning innocent conduct when grappling with 
unfamiliar business arrangements, making it the appropriate method of 
analyzing horizontal zero-price fixing. And the rule of reason itself can be 
tailored to fit the case at hand.
254
 Basic economic theory suggests leniency 
toward supplier-side zero-price fixing agreements. Conversely, courts 
should take a harder look at buyer-side agreements, though a per se rule 
presently remains inappropriate. 
2. Information- or Attention-Cost Fixing 
A second question raised by horizontal agreements in zero-price 
markets is how antitrust law ought to address agreements to fix attention 
or information cost levels. Given that information and attention often serve 
the same function as money in zero-price markets, should such agreements 
trigger the same rule of per se liability as price-fixing cartel activity? Or 
 
 
 249. Id. at 973. 
 250. Id. (“The NCAA asserts that the challenged restrictions on student–athlete compensation are 
reasonable because they are necessary to preserve its tradition of amateurism, maintain competitive 
balance among FBS football and Division I basketball teams, promote the integration of academics 
and athletics, and increase the total output of its product.”).  
 251. Id. at 1007. 
 252. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1071 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 253. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972) (“It is only after 
considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se 
violations of the Sherman Act.”). 
 254. See California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999). 
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are “cost fixing” agreements either sufficiently novel or likely to create 
unique benefits so as to warrant rule-of-reason treatment? 
No U.S. court to date appears to have faced the question. For a real-
world illustration, consider the contemporaneous privacy policy changes 
made by some of the largest firms then providing online search services. 
In 2008, Google “halved the amount of time it store[d] personal data to 
nine months.”255 In December 2008, Microsoft announced256 that it was 
willing to shorten the length of time after which it would anonymize users’ 
data from eighteen months to six months—provided that “its rivals did the 
same.”257 A few weeks later, Yahoo! announced that it would anonymize 
its users’ data after three months.258  
Harbour and Koslov identify this as an example of information-cost 
competition.
259
 Yet a slightly altered set of facts might have suggested a 
conspiracy. Suppose that, in response to Google’s announcement of a 
lower nine-month policy, Microsoft had announced that it was willing to 
adopt a six-month policy if its competitors also did so—and that, within a 
few weeks, both Yahoo! and Google had announced moves to a six-month 
policy.
260
 Such behavior could be interpreted as (1) an invitation to enter 
an agreement to fix information costs at a given (maximum) level, 
followed by (2) agreement by the soliciting firm’s rivals, as evidenced by 
their conduct. If competitors were to engage in such behavior vis-à-vis 
prices, their conduct would likely be a per se violation of Sherman Act 
§ 1.
261
 Under U.S. antitrust law, even agreements to fix maximum prices 
are per se illegal.
262
 
 
 
 255. Kim Dixon, Yahoo Cuts Data Retention to Three Months, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2008, 4:25 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/17/us-yahoo-data-idUSTRE4BG2VP20081217 [https:// 
perma.cc/HB2A-QKZF]. 
 256. David Burt, Microsoft Supports Strong Industry Search Data Anonymization Standards, 
TECHNET (Dec. 8, 2008, 6:23 PM), http://blogs.technet.com/b/privacyimperative/archive/2008/12/08/ 
microsoft-supports-strong-industry-search-data-anonymization-standards.aspx [https://perma.cc/ TA3R- 
W4BF]. The announcement was made in response to a Europe Commission working group’s opinion 
requesting Internet search companies to “adopt strong anonymization after 6 months.” Id. 
 257. Dixon, supra note 255. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Pamela Jones Harbour & Tara Isa Koslov, Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: An Expanded 
Vision of Relevant Product Markets, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 793–94 (2010). 
 260. And suppose further that Microsoft’s announcement was not in reaction to the European 
Commission’s working group opinion discussed supra note 256. 
 261. Cf. Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914, 923–24 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) 
(describing a meeting during which a representative of one rival firm “indicated to his competitors his 
preference for established prices in the industry,” followed by adoption of substantially similar, higher 
prices). 
 262. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
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At least in theory, a cartel could enter into an agreement to fix 
information or attention costs at a supracompetitive level.
263
 Applying the 
per se rule to such agreements would nonetheless be premature. Courts 
have not yet developed sufficient institutional knowledge to conclude with 
certainty that these cost-fixing agreements carry the same (or a 
substantially similar) high likelihood of harm and low likelihood of social 
benefits as traditional cartel activity. It may well be that cost-fixing 
agreements offer unique social benefits. Consider, for example, a group of 
broadcast-television stations that wish to televise both programming and 
advertisements. Some of the stations demand new programming; others 
seek (presumably lower-cost) syndicated programming. Because a given 
program may ultimately be aired on several different channels, it would 
benefit all involved parties to adopt established time-slots (e.g., thirty 
minutes) within which a given amount of time would be devoted to 
programming (e.g., twenty minutes) and the remainder would be devoted 
to advertisements. With such an agreement in place, program creators 
could confidently produce twenty-minute episodes that any station could 
conveniently syndicate. Horizontal attention-cost fixing agreements may 
thus create social benefits; the frequency with which they do so remains to 
be seen. Absent substantial experience evaluating such agreements, rule-
of-reason treatment is appropriate. 
B. Tying 
Tying arrangements are nominally per se illegal under U.S. antitrust 
law. In practice, however, proving a tying claim requires demonstrating 
five elements: (1) two separate products; (2) the supplier conditions the 
sale of one product (the “tying” product) on the customer’s also acquiring 
the second product (the “tied” product); (3) the supplier has substantial 
power in the market for the tying product; (4) the arrangement is likely to 
substantially harm competition; and (5) a “not insubstantial volume of 
commerce is affected.”264 Element (2) is sometimes called the “coercion” 
element.
265
 When the coercion element is accomplished via contract, the 
supplier engages in “contractual” tying; when the coercion element is 
 
 
 263. Such agreements may well be rare in practice—heterogeneity makes coordination more 
difficult. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING 242 (2013). Information 
costs (in particular) and attention costs tend to be heterogeneous, frustrating the formation and 
monitoring of horizontal agreements to fix them. See Newman, supra note 3, at 178–79. 
 264. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1702. 
 265.  See, e.g., R & G Affiliates, Inc. v. Knoll Int’l, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1395, 1399 (1984) (referring 
to the “coercion element”). 
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accomplished via technological interdependence, the supplier engages in 
“technological” tying.266 Contractual ties trigger a unique set of rules that 
raise challenges for zero-price applications.
267
 Technological ties, 
however, generally fall under Sherman Act § 2 and are treated under the 
traditional monopolization standard, which does not present such 
challenges.
268
 Thus, this Part focuses on contractual ties. 
As to contractual tying arrangements, the primary challenge raised by 
zero-price markets relates to U.S. Supreme Court precedent referring to 
“sales” and “purchases.” The Court has repeatedly described the conduct 
that satisfies the coercion element of a tying violation as “conditioning 
[the] sale of one commodity on the purchase of another.”269 The questions 
thus raised are (1) whether satisfying the coercion element of a tying 
violation requires proving a conditioned “sale”; (2) if so, whether a zero-
price transaction can satisfy the “sale” requirement; and (3) if not, whether 
a zero-price transaction can satisfy the coercion element. 
At least one court has squarely held that the coercion element does 
require a “sale,” and that zero-price transactions fail to qualify as such. In 
Stephen Jay Photography, local commercial photographers alleged that a 
group of large, national commercial photographers had entered into illegal 
tying arrangements in the Norfolk, Virginia area.
270
 The defendants had 
contracted with all of the high schools in the area to take yearbook 
photographs of students. While taking the yearbook photos, the defendants 
also took portrait photos.
271
 At least according to the district court,
272
 the 
yearbook photos were provided “at no charge” to the students; the portraits 
were not.
273
 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim, reasoning 
that “a tying arrangement cannot exist when the tying product is not sold 
 
 
 266. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1757a (discussing the difference between 
contractual and technological tying). 
 267.  See id. ¶ 1702 (relating the black-letter legal elements of a contractual tying violation). 
 268.  See id. ¶ 1757a (“Most challenges to technological ties are made under § 2 of the Sherman 
Act.”). 
 269. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12–13 (1984) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Times-Picayune Pub’g v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953)); accord N. Pac. Ry. v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10 (1958); see also id. at 5 (“[A] tying arrangement may be defined as an 
agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a 
different (or tied) product.”); Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independ. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45−46 
(2006) (holding that patents do not create a presumption of market power in markets for tying 
products). 
 270. Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988, 990 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 271. Id.  
 272. The appellate court read the record to indicate that one of the defendants did charge a 
“nominal fee” to “some senior students” for the yearbook photos. Id. at 991. 
 273. Id. 
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to the consumer, but is provided free of charge.”274 Using a similar 
analysis to address inverse facts (positive-price tying product, zero-price 
tied product), a court applying state unfair-competition law dismissed a 
complaint that alleged a tying scheme involving broadcast television.
275
 
The proper understanding of the coercion element, however, focuses on 
the question of coercion itself—not on a formalistic inquiry into whether 
there was a “sale,” however defined. As the Supreme Court explained in 
Jefferson Parish, “not every refusal to sell two products separately can be 
said to restrain competition.”276 It is not suppliers’ requiring a concurrent 
“sale” (or “purchase”) per se that threatens anticompetitive harm. Instead, 
it is the presence of coercion—as the leading treatise puts it, the threat of 
harm occurs where “[t]he customer takes the second . . . product from the 
defendant, not because he prefers it but only because he must take it in 
order to obtain a desired . . . product, either at all or on favorable terms.”277  
Where the U.S. Supreme Court has referred to the coercion element as 
the “conditioning” of a “sale,” it has done so when analyzing traditional, 
positive-price markets.
278
 The language of Sherman Act § 1, on which 
zero-price tying claims would likely be predicated,
279
 requires only a 
“contract,” not a “sale.”280 And courts applying the common law of 
contracts have long recognized that zero-price agreements predicated on 
one party’s exchanging information281 or attention282 can be valid 
contracts.
283
 Thus, the question of whether zero-price transactions are 
“sales” for purposes of tying analysis (which the Stephen Jay Photography 
court incorrectly treated as dispositive) is immaterial.
284
 
 
 
 274. Id. (appearing to quote the district court’s decision without attribution (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). The appellate court affirmed on somewhat different grounds, basing its reasoning on 
the fact that the defendants did not require students to purchase portrait photos, but rather made 
yearbook photos available with or without a portrait purchase). Id. 
 275. See Morrison v. Viacom, Inc., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
 276. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11 (1984). 
 277. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1702. 
 278. Even the Stephen Jay Photography court prefaced its quoting of such language with the 
qualifier “[t]ypically.” Stephen Jay Photography, 903 F.2d at 991. 
 279. Clayton Act § 3 prohibits tying, but—unlike Sherman Act § 1—§ 3 explicitly requires a “sale 
or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities.” 15 
U.S.C. § 14 (2012). Since tying claims can also be pursued under Sherman Act § 1, plaintiffs can be 
expected to avoid the “sale” issue by filing under § 1. 
 280. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 281. E.g., Gottlieb v. Tropicana Hotel and Casino, 109 F. Supp. 2d 324, 329−30 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
 282. E.g., Jennings v. Radio Station KSCS, 708 S.W.2d 60, 61–62 (Tex. App. 1986). 
 283. See Newman, supra note 3, at 172 (arguing that such precedent supports the conclusion that 
attention and information costs may be exchanged, bringing zero-price transactions within the scope of 
the antitrust laws). 
 284. What constitutes a “sale” for broader legal purposes is an open question. Article 2 of the 
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Given that the coercion element does not hinge on whether there was a 
“sale,” it is immaterial whether zero-price transactions involve “sales” or 
“purchases.” Rather, the question is whether coercion itself can occur. 
Coercion may be present where one of the products in a tying arrangement 
is offered at a price of zero. In Lucas Industries, Inc., for example, the 
court rightly rejected the defendant’s argument that coercion was lacking 
because the tying product was offered for “no charge.”285 Lucas, the 
defendant, produced and distributed diesel fuel-injection systems, as well 
as technical literature explaining how to repair the systems.
286
 The plaintiff 
alleged that Lucas conditioned the availability of its technical literature 
(the tying product) on its customers’ agreeing to buy Lucas’ fuel-injection 
systems (the tied product).
287
 In response, Lucas argued both that the 
technical literature was not a “separate product” (because Lucas did not 
“sell its technical literature to anyone but provide[d] the technical 
information at no cost”)288 and that the coercion element was not met.289 
The court rejected both arguments, reasoning that in light of Lucas’ large 
market share, it was reasonable to infer that Lucas was “using its control 
over technical literature to force [customers] to purchase pumps and 
parts.”290 
The Microsoft case presented the inverse situation: a positive-price 
tying product and a zero-price tied product. One of the government’s 
theories of liability (successful at the trial level) was that Microsoft had 
contractually and technologically tied its web browser to its dominant 
OS.
291
 The D.C. Circuit reversed the trial court’s application of the 
modified per se rule, holding that the novelty of both Microsoft’s 
challenged conduct and the relevant markets necessitated a rule-of-reason 
 
 
Uniform Commercial Code, for example, defines a “sale” as “the passing of title from the seller to the 
buyer for a price.” U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014) (emphasis 
added). Courts have in other areas suggested a broader reading. E.g., Baum v. Astrazeneca LP, 605 F. 
Supp. 2d 669, 677 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (observing, as to state employment law, that “[t]he precise 
contours of a ‘sale’ naturally differ across industries, markets, and even cultures”). 
 285. Lucas Indus. v. Kendiesel, Inc., No. 93−4480, 1995 WL 350050, at *4 (D.N.J. June 9, 1995). 
 286. Id. at *1. 
 287. Id. at *4. The challenged conduct could be analyzed as a hybrid tying-exclusive dealing 
scheme: Lucas used its technical literature as the tying product and its fuel-injection systems as the 
tied product, but it went a step further by requiring that its customers buy all their fuel-injection 
systems from Lucas. See id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at *5. 
 290. Id. 
 291. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also John M. 
Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 681, 720−22 
(2012) (analyzing Microsoft under the rubric of product-design conduct). 
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analysis.
292
 The case was settled without a substantive ruling on the 
government’s tying claims. Yet—given that Microsoft enjoyed a share of 
at least 80% (and perhaps more than 95%) in the OS market
293
 and 
essentially refused to license its OS to downstream customers unless they 
also licensed its web browser
294—the coercion element may well have 
been satisfied. The absence of a positive price charged for Microsoft’s web 
browser did not necessarily preclude the possibility of anticompetitive 
harm.
295
 
Where a defendant has no economic interest relating to the zero-price 
product, however, no liability should arise from an apparent “tying” 
arrangement. Thus, for example, in Directory Sales Management Corp. v. 
Ohio Bell Telephone Co., the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
rejection of the claim that a telephone services provider illegally tied “free 
yellow pages listing[s]” to telephone services.296 Not only were businesses 
allowed to refuse the free listings, but the defendant had no economic 
interest in tying the two products together—it already enjoyed a monopoly 
in the telephone services market, and it truly charged its services 
subscribers nothing for the free listings.
297
 Similarly, in a case alleging that 
a charitable organization had engaged in illegal tying, the Ninth Circuit 
declined to find liability—the seller of the tying product had no economic 
interest in the “tied” product (an examination form provided free of 
charge).
298
 A district court likewise rejected a claim predicated on a 
television provider’s “tying” the production of public service 
announcements (PSAs), in part because the defendant’s time spent 
producing PSAs was charitably donated.
299
 
 
 
 292. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 84. 
 293. Id. at 54. 
 294. Microsoft’s licensing practices were more complicated than traditional tying arrangements—
rather than simply predicating the licensing of its OS on the licensing of its web browser, Microsoft 
(for example) prohibited customers from removing the “desktop icons, folders, and Start menu entries” 
for its web browser from its OS. Id. at 61. 
 295. As Bork explained, Microsoft “was earning supracompetitive returns on the monopoly it was 
defending, while Netscape, forced to distribute its Navigator free, had no income in that market to 
cover its fixed costs. Understandably, Netscape gave up a contest it could not win.” Bork, supra note 
143, at 55. 
 296. Directory Sales Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 833 F.2d 606, 608 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 297. Id. at 609−10. The defendant required the third-party phonebook publisher to provide the free 
listings, apparently believing such listings served the public interest—the defendant was, at the time of 
the agreement with the publisher, a subsidiary of AT&T before its breakup in 1984. Id. at 608. 
 298. See Rickards v. Canine Eye Registration Found., Inc., 704 F.2d 1449, 1455 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 299. See Drake v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., No. 10−2671−JTM, 2011 WL 2680688, at *2 (D. Kan. 
2011). Additionally, it is not clear that the plaintiff alleged that the defendant actually tied the PSAs to 
any other “product.” Id. at *4. 
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C. Exclusive Dealing 
Though precedent in the area is sparse, at least one U.S. court has 
squarely confronted an exclusive-dealing claim involving a zero-price 
market. In Feitelson v. Google, Inc., a putative class of consumers 
challenged agreements allegedly made between Google, creator of the 
popular Android mobile OS, and various mobile telephone manufacturers 
(OEMs).
300
 According to the complaint, Google licensed the Android OS 
to various OEMs “for free.”301 Google also allowed OEMs to “pre-load,” 
free of charge, its popular applications (e.g., YouTube) onto mobile 
telephones.
302
 The gravamen of the complaint was exclusive dealing: 
Google required OEMs that pre-loaded Google applications to “also agree 
to make Google the default search engine for all ‘search access points’ on 
the device.”303 The relevant markets were alleged to be the U.S. markets 
for “general search” and “handheld general search.”304 
The court held that the complaint failed to satisfactorily allege the 
substantive elements required for a successful exclusive-dealing claim. 
Specifically problematic was the plaintiffs’ failure “to demonstrate 
substantial foreclosure of competition in [the relevant] markets.”305 The 
court reasoned that a 51.7% share of the U.S. smartphone OS market did 
not support a finding of substantial foreclosure in the markets for “general 
search” or “handheld general search,” particularly given that the exclusive-
dealing arrangements affected only a subset of devices equipped with 
Google’s OS.306 That said, at least as to the handheld general search 
market, the court called its decision “a close call.”307 
The Feitelson court’s focus on substantial foreclosure (or lack thereof) 
in the relevant markets may have been misdirected. Google obtained 
default search status, but it did not prevent OEMs from including other 
search providers as alternative options. Thus, Google’s conduct could be 
viewed as merely obtaining preferential treatment from a downstream 
customer. On this view, Google offered something of value—its popular 
applications at zero prices—in exchange for an advantageous promotional 
 
 
 300. Feitelson v. Google, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 301. First Amended Class Action Complaint at 3, Feitelson v. Google, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1019 
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 5:14-cv-02007-BLF). 
 302. Id. 
 303. Feitelson, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 1023 (quoting First Amended Class Action Complaint at 13-14). 
 304. Id. (quoting First Amended Class Action Complaint at 9, 31). 
 305. Id. at 1031. 
 306. Id. at 1032. 
 307. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 49 Newman book pages 12/13/2016  
 
 
 
 
 
102 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:49 
 
 
 
 
placement. Courts have routinely declined to condemn instances of 
suppliers’ giving incentives for preferential promotional treatment while 
allowing rivals’ products to remain available to consumers.308 So long as 
the applications market was (or markets were) sufficiently competitive,
309
 
such that Google’s search rivals could offer similar benefits to OEMs in an 
attempt to gain similar preferential promotional treatment (i.e., default 
status), it is difficult to see any potential harm arising from the conduct 
challenged by the plaintiffs in Feitelson.  
In general, the Feitelson court was rightly skeptical of the plaintiffs’ 
pleadings,
310
 demanding greater factual rigor before exposing the 
defendant to extensive discovery requirements. This skepticism is in 
keeping with a healthy suspicion of claims involving exclusive dealing, 
which—in zero-price contexts as in more traditional markets—often 
carries with it procompetitive benefits.
311
 While its focus on the question 
of substantial foreclosure in the relevant markets may have been 
misplaced, the Feitelson court encouragingly did more than mere “hand 
waving”312 when confronted by zero prices. 
D. Predatory Pricing 
In theory, though perhaps no longer in practice,
313
 a defendant can 
violate the antitrust laws by predatory pricing. The modern standard 
requires plaintiffs to satisfy two elements in order to make out a predatory-
 
 
 308. See, e.g., El Aguila Food Prods., Inc. v. Gruma Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 612, 628−31 (S.D. 
Tex. 2003); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 362, 379−86 (M.D.N.C. 
2002); Louisa Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 804, 813−16 
(E.D. Ky. 1999). 
 309. For an argument that the relevant applications markets were not competitive, see Benjamin 
Edelman, Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling?, 11 J. COMPETITION L. 
& ECON. 365, 390–91 (2015) (addressing Google’s conduct under the rubric of tying). 
 310. Russia’s Federal Anti-Monopoly Service (“FAMS”) was not as skeptical of a similar 
complaint filed by Yandex NV, then Russia’s largest search engine, against Google—in September 
2015, the FAMS ruled that Google’s “requir[ing] equipment makers to pre-stall its services, including 
search, to get the Google Play application store on their devices” violated Russia’s antitrust laws. Ilya 
Khrennikov, Russia Says Google Violated Antitrust Laws, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 14, 2015), 
http://antitrust.bna.com/atrc/7031/split_display.adp?fedfid=75712154&vname=atdbulallissues&jd=a0
h2r0t8b2&split=0. 
 311. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 1810. 
 312. Compare Feitelson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 1019, with Evans, supra note 6, at 72. 
 313. See Thomas J. Horton, Unraveling the Chicago/Harvard Antitrust Double Helix: Applying 
Evolutionary Theory to Guard Competitors and Revive Antitrust Jury Trials, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 615, 
648 n.194 (2012) (“Since Matsushita was decided in 1986, no plaintiff, including the Department of 
Justice, has succeeded in satisfying the two prong ‘below cost + recoupment’ standard.”) (quoting 
ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN 
COMPETITION POLICY 672, 699−700 (2d ed. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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pricing claim: (1) the defendant sold its product at prices below some 
measure of its own cost, and (2) after rivals or potential entrants are 
neutralized, the defendant is likely to recoup its losses in the form of 
monopoly profits. Gal and Rubinfeld helpfully distinguish between two 
types of predatory-pricing schemes involving zero prices: (1) “short-term 
provision of free goods . . . based on a two-staged strategy in which the 
price is raised and initial losses recouped once the threat of entry or 
expansion is lifted”; and (2) “those [cases] in which the free product will 
always be provided for free.”314 The first, which allows a fairly 
straightforward analysis using traditional antitrust principles, is well-
recognized as a potential violation.
315
 The second is less well-explored. 
The most notable litigated case involving zero-price-related conduct 
that “can be seen as a form of predatory pricing” is United States v. 
Microsoft.
316
 Broadly speaking, Microsoft competed in both the OS market 
(where its Windows OS held a dominant position) and the web browser 
market (with its Internet Explorer, or “IE” browser). Though the 
government did not pursue a predatory-pricing theory on appeal, it did so 
at the trial-court level.
317
 One treatise observes that because “Microsoft 
makes enough revenue from collateral sources—and the marginal cost of 
another copy of the [IE] Web browser, especially in electronic form, is so 
low—that its price does not seem predatory.”318 Yet, the fact that the 
marginal costs to Microsoft of producing and distributing copies of IE 
were low does not preclude a predation scheme on its part. Microsoft still 
needed to recoup the fixed costs of producing IE, which were high (well 
over $100 million per year).
319
 And the first point (that Microsoft made 
substantial revenue from related sources) may actually indicate, rather than 
obviate, the possibility of predation. As Leslie points out, “Microsoft did 
not recoup in the market in which the predation occurred—browsers—but 
 
 
 314. Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 3. 
 315. See, e.g., id.; Gerald F. Hayden Jr., Predatory Pricing: The Combines Investigation Act—
Subsection 34(1)(c), a Violation in Search of a Standard, 21 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 537, 546 (1983). 
 316. Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1722 
(2013). 
 317. The Government alleged as much in its case against Microsoft. Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed 
Findings of Fact, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1999 WL 1419040 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1999) (Civ. 
Action No. 98−1232 (TPJ)), https://www.justice.gov/atr/us-v-microsoft-proposed-findings-fact-2 
(“Microsoft set a zero price for its browser for the purpose of depriving Netscape of revenue and 
protecting its operating system monopoly.”). 
 318. HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES 
APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 13.5(b) (2015). 
 319. See Leslie, supra note 316, at 1722. 
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it did recoup elsewhere.”320 Specifically, Microsoft was able to recoup its 
IE-related losses in the complementary OS market. 
The Microsoft facts illustrate an important point regarding antitrust 
scrutiny of predatory-pricing in zero-price markets: ignoring the 
interconnected way(s) in which suppliers profit from zero-price products 
will yield faulty results. These errors may arise in three ways. 
First, by failing to take into account the all-in “price” charged—which 
may include information or attention costs—courts may wrongly find 
below-cost pricing. Gal and Rubinfeld suggest that the below-cost pricing 
“requirement is easily met with regard to free goods: zero is clearly below 
cost.”321 Under this view, the below-cost pricing requirement would 
essentially be obviated in zero-price markets.
322
 To avoid such a result, 
antitrust law should require proof of an all-in price that would include any 
attendant information or attention costs, then determine whether that price 
was set below the defendant’s cost.323 This two-step analysis is necessary 
because the recoupment element alone may not be enough to prevent false 
positives.
324
 Firms offering zero prices must always recoup their losses 
somehow—but not in the sense contemplated by the predatory-pricing 
recoupment requirement. Courts that have conclusorily found the below-
cost pricing element to be satisfied may well be overly quick to find 
recoupment (in the predatory-pricing sense) given this inherent structural 
feature of zero-price markets. To avoid false positives, satisfying the 
 
 
 320. Id. 
 321. Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 41. 
 322. On the Microsoft facts, the problem of underestimating price due to unrecognized 
information or attention costs was not present—Microsoft did not profit via extracting information or 
attention from users of its Internet browser.  
 323. In a state antitrust law case applying the federal predatory-pricing standard, the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin espoused a somewhat similar requirement. There, the Court held that “advertising 
revenue directly derived from increased circulation . . . must be considered when determining whether 
below-cost pricing [to readers] occurred.” Conley Publ’g. Grp. Ltd. v. Journal Commc’ns, Inc., 665 
N.W.2d 879, 895 (Wis. 2003). Similarly, in a California unfair competition case, the court rejected a 
plaintiff’s argument that “the price [the defendant] charges to watch a video—zero—is less than what 
it costs [the defendant] to maintain the video on its server.” Cammarata v. Bright Imperial Ltd., No. 
B218226, 2011 WL 227943, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. as last modified on denial of rehearing Feb. 24, 
2011). Recognizing that the defendant profited via attention costs, the court concluded that if the 
plaintiff’s “subscription-based website lost revenue . . . it was because the [defendant’s] business 
model is more efficient, not because of alleged predatory pricing.” Id. at *7. Finally, in a Maryland 
antitrust case, the court rejected a plaintiff’s claim that the defendant’s offering “electronic 
connectivity services” at zero prices to doctors constituted predatory pricing, where the defendant 
charged positive (indeed, high) prices to insurance companies for access to the services. Martello v. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Maryland, Inc., 795 A.2d 185, 199 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002). 
 324. Gal and Rubinfeld suggest, to the contrary, that “[a] requirement of potential recoupment, as 
required in the U.S., solves this false positive problem.” Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 43. 
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below-cost pricing element as to zero-price products should require 
calculation of an all-in price against which to measure cost.
325
  
Second, courts may wrongly overlook actual predation by failing to 
take into account sources of profit that do not depend on charging a 
positive price for the relevant product.
326
 Put another way, focusing the 
recoupment analysis too narrowly in a zero-price market context may yield 
the incorrect conclusion that recoupment is impossible—how could zero 
prices yield monopoly profits?
327
 Taking into account a defendant’s 
related, positive-price activity (e.g., Microsoft’s selling OSs) provides the 
(potential) answer. 
Third, courts may overlook the possibility of a classically structured 
predatory-pricing scheme that substitutes information or attention 
overcharges for supracompetitive prices. As to other types of potentially 
anticompetitive conduct, some analysts have made the mistake of turning a 
blind eye to the exchanged nature of information and attention costs.
328
 
Yet a dominant firm could, at least in theory, establish low levels of 
information or attention costs (e.g., by including no advertisements with 
the relevant product) during a predation period, then raise cost levels to a 
supracompetitive level (e.g., an onerous privacy policy or level of 
advertisements) during a recoupment period. Avoiding false negatives 
requires recognizing that attention or information often stand in for money 
in zero-price markets.
329
  
 
 
 325. Of course, doing so will be difficult. Yet, given that plaintiffs have uniformly failed to prove 
predatory-pricing claims after Matsushita, see supra note 313, even without the added complication of 
calculating an all-in price, the objection seems purely academic. If it is already, in practice, impossible 
to prove a predatory pricing violation, it would be a hollow objection to contend that the present 
proposal will raise the bar even higher. The false-positive problems associated with declining to do so, 
however, would not be subject to the same critique. It should also be noted that this discussion 
assumes that the below-cost pricing requirement serves a useful purpose, a point not uniformly agreed 
upon. See Leslie, supra note 316, at 1765 (“Predatory pricing can be anticompetitive and reduce 
consumer welfare even in the absence of recoupment. This makes recoupment an inappropriate 
element for an antitrust violation.”). 
 326. See Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 4, at 43 (“[A] narrow application of the recoupment 
requirement might create another set of errors: false negatives.”). 
 327. As Wright and Manne put it: “From the point of view of the buyers . . . , these monopolists 
are really pathetic at extracting profits, as most of them give away their products for free.”). Geoffrey 
Manne & Joshua Wright, What’s an Internet Monopolist? A Reply to Professor Wu, TRUTH ON MKT. 
(Nov. 22, 2010), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/11/22/whats-an-internetmonopolist-a-reply-to-
professor-wu/ [http://perma.cc/L4UF-UC7K]. 
 328. See Newman, supra note 3, at 190, 193−94 for examples. 
 329. See id. at 202; cf. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 318, § 13.5(b) (“Alternatively, 
[companies] may give away products (such as television or radio broadcasts or Internet services) in 
exchange for the attention of their customers.”). 
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E. Refusals to Deal 
Multiple antitrust investigations and lawsuits have involved possible 
refusals to deal in zero-price markets. Certainly the most high-profile to 
date have been the long-running, much-debated, multijurisdictional 
inquiries into whether Google, Inc.’s search practices anticompetitively 
favor its own vertically integrated services. Yet these inquiries are not 
entirely unique; U.S. courts have also analyzed refusals to deal in other 
zero-price contexts. 
In Kinderstart.com, the plaintiff, Kinderstart, operated a specialized 
search engine that provided “links to information and resources on 
subjects related to young children.”330 According to a complaint 
Kinderstart filed against Google, Inc., Google engaged in various 
anticompetitive strategies designed to harm competition, including a 
refusal to deal: “the practice of ‘Blockage’ of websites by ‘delisting, de-
indexing and censoring’ websites”331 from the search results delivered to 
Google’s users. The court dismissed Kinderstart’s complaint for various 
defects. Though the U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly required a 
“prior voluntary course of dealing” as an element to bringing a successful 
refusal-to-deal claim, lower courts, following the reasoning of Trinko,
332
 
have generally adopted this element as a prophylactic gatekeeper.
333
 Thus, 
as to the Kinderstart.com plaintiff’s refusal-to-deal claim, the court 
distinguished the facts alleged from those in Aspen Skiing Co.
334—unlike 
the defendant in Aspen Skiing Co., Google had never voluntarily dealt with 
Kinderstart.
335
 
In LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., the plaintiff operated a social-
networking website (vidilife.com) that competed with defendant 
MySpace’s website.336 Allegedly, MySpace altered its website so as to 
prevent its users from viewing or posting links to videos hosted at 
 
 
 330. Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2006 WL 3246596, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2006). 
 331. Id. at *3. 
 332. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 333. See, e.g., Am. Cent. E. Texas Gas Co. v. Union Pac. Res. Grp. Inc., 93 Fed. App’x. 1, 8 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (citations omitted) (“Courts admittedly must be cautious in finding exception to the right to 
refuse to deal. However, the court notes that [defendant] refused to deal in the context of a prior course 
of dealing with ACET.”). 
 334. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
 335. Kinderstart.com LLC, 2006 WL 3246596, at *10. 
 336. LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV 06−6994 AHM (RZx), 2007 WL 6865852, at 
*1 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007), aff’d, 304 Fed. App’x. 554 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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vidilife.com.
337
 The plaintiff sued MySpace, claiming that such conduct 
amounted to a refusal to deal in violation of Sherman Act § 2.
338
 In a 
decision affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, the district court dismissed the 
complaint. Again following the reasoning of Trinko, the LiveUniverse, Inc. 
district court reasoned that MySpace’s merely allowing its users to 
reference other websites did not amount to a prior voluntary course of 
dealing between MySpace and the plaintiff.
339
 
Two years later, the court in Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc.,
340
 
rejected a somewhat similar claim against social-network Facebook 
(which had, by then, surpassed MySpace in terms of U.S.-based users).
341
 
In Power Ventures, a rival alleged that Facebook anticompetitively 
“prohibit[ed] its users from logging into Facebook through third-party 
sites.”342 The court dismissed the rival’s antitrust counterclaim, rejecting 
“the proposition that Facebook is somehow obligated to allow third-party 
websites unfettered access to its own website simply because some other 
third-party websites grant that privilege to Facebook.”343 As in the 
Kinderstart.com and Liveuniverse cases, no prior voluntary course of 
dealing existed between the alleged monopolist (here, Facebook) and its 
rival(s).  
Taken together, these cases suggest that refusals to deal in zero-price 
markets (as elsewhere) will likely be unsuccessful absent a prior direct 
relationship between rivals.
344
 Thus, to take the example of the charges 
leveled at Google, noted above, these cases suggest that—without more—
mere allegations that Google manipulated search results so as to favor its 
own affiliate websites would likely not pass muster under U.S. antitrust 
law. If, however, as a leaked FTC Staff Report suggested, such 
manipulations occur following a direct, “long-established, voluntary, and 
mutually beneficial”345 relationship between rivals, a rival alleging an 
 
 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. at *13. 
 340. No. C 08−05780 JW, 2010 WL 3291750 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010). 
 341. JR Raphael, PCWORLD, Facebook Overtakes MySpace in U.S. (June 16, 2009, 3:35 PM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/166794/Facebook_Overtakes_MySpace_in_US.html. 
 342. Power Ventures, 2010 WL 3291750, at *13. 
 343. Id. 
 344. See David Golden, Refusals to Deal in the Big Data Era, LAW360 (Oct. 27, 2014, 10:14 
AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/589545/refusals-to-deal-in-the-big-data-era [perma.cc/X4L7-
K6QQ] (observing that “[n]o direct contractual relationship existed between Power Ventures and 
Facebook”). 
 345. See Memorandum to FED. TRADE COMM’N, SUBJECT: GOOGLE, INC. 88 (Aug. 8, 2012) 
http://graphics.wsj.com/google-ftc-report/img/ftc-ocr-watermark.pdf. 
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anticompetitive refusal to deal would enjoy a relatively higher likelihood 
of success in court. 
F. Mergers 
Mergers and acquisitions affecting zero-price markets present unique 
issues—and a cautionary tale. The most critical type of error made in this 
arena to date, and thus the issue that the following discussion focuses on, 
is that of false negatives: concluding that transactions are unlikely to harm 
competition where such harm is, in fact, likely to occur.
346
 The most 
certain way to make such errors is to fail even to consider a source of 
potential harm, which some analysts have (unfortunately) done in the past 
when confronted with transactions involving zero-price markets. By 
failing to conceive of zero-price markets as such, analysts deprive 
themselves of any chance to detect probable anticompetitive effects. 
The likelihood of such failures appears to vary depending on the 
particular zero-price strategies being employed by market participants. 
Specifically, analysts appear more likely to recognize the possibility of 
harm where freemium or complementary-products strategies are 
employed.
347
 This is likely so because the relatively close nexus between 
zero- and positive-price products in such markets makes them closer 
analogues to traditional positive-price markets. Thus, for example, in 
United States v. H & R Block, Inc.,
348
 the government successfully 
challenged the proposed acquisition of TaxACT by H & R Block. Prior to 
its proposed acquisition, TaxACT had long employed a freemium strategy, 
offering “free” basic “digital do-it-yourself (DDIY) federal tax return 
preparation services in addition to positive-price “deluxe” editions and 
state returns.
349
 Thus, there was a close nexus between TaxACT’s zero- 
and positive-price products.
350
 Competitors followed suit, and offering 
some combination of “free” and paid DDIY services become the industry 
norm.
351
 Having defined the relevant market so as to include both positive- 
and zero-price DDIY products, the court concluded that the proposed 
 
 
 346.  See Newman, supra note 3, at 193. 
 347. For an explanation of the three primary types of sustainable zero-price business models, see 
Newman, supra note 3, at 154−57. 
 348. 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 349. Id. at 43, 46. 
 350. See id. at 88 (“[B]ecause free DDIY products [were] often packaged with other paid 
products, these ‘free’ products actually provide[d] the companies with a positive average revenue per 
free unit.”). 
 351. Id. at 48 (“Today, free offers in various forms are an entrenched part of the . . . market.”). 
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transaction would likely lessen competition in that market.
352
 Among other 
potential sources of harm, the court held that the transaction would have 
reduced head-to-head competition—including price and quality 
competition involving “free” products—between the defendants.353 
Analysts appear less likely to recognize the possibility of harm where 
zero prices are charged to customers on one side of a multi-sided market. 
The temptation is to focus solely on potential harm to customers on the 
positive-price side of the market, ignoring nonmonetary harm to customers 
on the zero-price side. For example, in the late 1990s, deregulation of the 
broadcast-radio industry led to a massive wave of mergers and 
acquisitions, many of them reviewable by DOJ.
354
 DOJ’s analyses of both 
market definition and market power addressed solely prices to advertisers; 
DOJ did not consider potential harm to listeners.
355
 Yet, recent empirical 
research suggests such harm did occur, in the form of greater attention 
costs (i.e., a higher ratio of advertisements to content), in many markets.
356
 
The problem of such false negatives is substantial, and may well be 
increasing in magnitude along with the general proliferation of zero-price 
products. Multiple recent high-profile mergers have involved zero-price 
products, including (perhaps most notably) the Facebook–Instagram 
acquisition. When Facebook’s $1 billion acquisition of Instagram (a 
company with zero revenue and only a handful of employees) was 
announced, industry observers almost immediately identified eliminating 
competition as the probable incentive for the deal.
357
 The two firms 
offered what were likely the two zero-price photo-sharing social networks 
most popular among consumers—yet the FTC unanimously cleared the 
acquisition.
358
 Since the FTC offered no guidance as to its decision, it is 
 
 
 352. Id. at 45. 
 353. Id. at 85. 
 354. For an extended discussion of this history, see Newman, supra note 3, at 190–93; see also 
Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Why More Antitrust Immunity for the Media Is a Bad Idea, 105 
NW. U. L. REV. 1399, 1411−15 (2011). 
 355. See Joel I. Klein, Acting Ass’t Atty Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice, Speech at the ANA 
Hotel: DOJ Analysis of Radio Mergers 7–19 (Feb. 19, 1997), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ 
speeches/1055.pdf. 
 356. See Mooney, supra note 52, at 19. 
 357. See, e.g., Om Malik, Here Is Why Facebook Bought Instagram, GIGAOM (Apr. 9, 2012, 
11:28 AM), https://gigaom.com/2012/04/09/here-is-why-did-facebook-bought-instagram/ [https://perma. 
cc/6BKA-MTWC] (“Facebook was scared shitless and knew that for the first time in its life it arguably 
had a competitor that could not only eat its lunch, but also destroy its future prospects. Why? Because 
Facebook is essentially about photos.”). 
 358. Alexei Oreskovic, FTC Clears Facebook’s Acquisition of Instagram, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 
2012, 8:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/23/us-facebook-instagram-idUSBRE87L14 
W20120823. 
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impossible to know whether the agency adequately evaluated potential 
anticompetitive harm to users (not just to advertisers). But, if FTC 
followed the lead set by DOJ in the broadcast-radio context, it may have 
ignored a source of potential harm. 
Merger analyses must include scrutiny of the zero-price side of 
multisided platforms. The demand curves exhibited by customers on one 
side of a platform (e.g., advertisers) can be quite different than those 
exhibited by customers on the other side (e.g., consumers).
359
 To take an 
example, suppose that the candidate relevant market is “organic search,” 
that the market is dominated by three large firms, and that the two largest 
firms have proposed a merger. The prevailing business model used by 
online search providers is two-sided.
360
 Providers charge zero prices (but 
attention costs) to users and positive prices to advertisers.  
Advertisers may view search results and, for example, online email 
services as close substitutes: both are means of delivering ads to 
consumers. As a result, at least one court has held that “search-based 
advertising is reasonably interchangeable with other forms of Internet 
advertising.”361 In fact, advertisers may even view offline venues like 
billboards as fairly close substitutes for online platforms.
362
 To a user, 
however, social networks and email services may not be as closely 
substitutable, and billboards are so distant as to be irrelevant. In such a 
 
 
 359. Empirical analysis of programming conducted in the wake of deregulation shows that the 
advertising time increases as firm size increases (i.e., as market concentration increases); tellingly, the 
amount of time devoted to advertisements increases most sharply during times of the day when 
listeners have fewer ready substitutes. Mooney, supra note 52, at 2. 
 360. See James D. Ratliff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Is There a Market for Organic Search Engine 
Results and Can Their Manipulation Give Rise to Antitrust Liability?, J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
517, 518 (2014) (“[W]e discuss and describe Google’s business model, which is primarily a two-sided 
platform to sell advertising.”). Ratliff & Rubinfeld conclude that because “feedback effects” link the 
two sides of search platforms, the relevant market is “at least as broad as a two-sided search-
advertising market.” Id. at 519. Their conclusion relies heavily on the fact that Google could not 
profitably provide organic search results without also selling advertising. Id. at 536. Yet a similar 
observation could be made about any business. Take, for example, a grocery store: the store could not 
profitably purchase food without also selling it. The bare fact that a given competitive practice is 
related to, or even necessary for, competition in a different area does not compel a single antitrust 
market. Where, as with search, the two sides of a platform exhibit different demand curves, it seems 
appropriate to follow the American Express Co. court in reasoning that the two—though “deeply 
interrelated”—may constitute separate markets. See supra note 97. 
 361. Person v. Google, Inc., No. C 06−7297 JF (RS), 2007 WL 1831111, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 
2007). 
 362. As Waller points out, “[i]t is an open question whether online advertising is even a separate 
relevant market from its offline alternatives.” Waller, supra note 90, at 1782. Goldfarb and Tucker find 
that “online display advertising is a substitute for offline display (primarily billboard) advertising.” 
Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Advertising Bans and the Substitutability of Online and Offline 
Advertising, 48 J. MKTG RESEARCH 207, 208 (2011). 
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scenario, advertisers may exhibit relatively elastic demand, meaning they 
could easily substitute away to defeat a price increase by the merged firm. 
Yet consumers may exhibit relatively inelastic demand, meaning they are 
more likely to be harmed by attention- or information-cost overcharges 
imposed by the merged firm as an exercise of the post-merger increase in 
its market power.  
Focusing solely on potential harm to positive-price customers (in the 
above example, advertisers) thus not only overlooks one source of 
potential harm—it overlooks the most likely source of potential harm. As 
a general matter, ignoring harm to zero-price customers has caused and, 
unless the practice is stopped, will continue to cause harm to competition 
and consumer welfare. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Antitrust law and economics understandably depend heavily on the 
presence of positive prices. Products are, however, increasingly being 
offered in exchange for customers’ attention and information instead of 
their money. The antitrust enterprise finds itself confronted with 
fundamental questions about its own role and efficacy in these markets. 
And, at least in their current state, many of the standard tools used by 
modern antitrust analysts will be difficult or impossible to use in the 
presence of zero prices.  
Yet the framework underlying such tools often proves to be “supple 
enough”363 for use in zero-price markets. Moreover, while some of the 
extant case law gives reason for concern, at least a few courts have 
squarely confronted the unique issues presented by zero prices. Those 
courts have not always done so perfectly, but they have at least tentatively 
begun the process of modernization. That process is of vital, and growing, 
importance. For antitrust law to play its congressionally mandated role of 
safeguarding competition, it must continue to adapt and evolve in the face 
of zero-price markets. 
 
 
 363. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 925 (2001) 
(arguing that the antitrust enterprise is “supple enough, and its commitment to economic rationality 
strong enough, to take in stride the competitive issues presented by the new economy”). 
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